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LEGAL PROVISIONS PURSUANT TO RUCA 24(a) '6X *URCP

i pertinent part:

(e)
Form
of
affidavits;
further
testimony;
defense
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissable in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn
or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith ...
Emphasis Added.
URE

:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or
explaining the event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition or immediately
thereafter.
Emphasis Added.
URCP 11 states in pertinent part:
...The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well founded in fact
and warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation ... If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose on the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Emphasis Added.

, -^;tM«NMJ MQNEYiSALES AGREEMENT:

&•/*£?*
Legend

Yes(X)

'~*

No(Oj

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT

February 19, 1991

DATE:
i;*i*:»,:. f'Z* £?•'

David J Stephan 1 ^ HbxirUd_
The undersigned Buyer
One Hundred «nc
as EARNEST MONEY, the amount of

_ hereby deposits with Brokerage
. Dollars ($ JL

00,00

_j,

in the form nf
a cashiers
Check
in tne form oi
n V ^ I I M W I J—»>».^-••
.
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable t>tate Law
£ 0 1 - 2 0 » - 9 8 4 0'- Received by.
Phone Number
Brokerage

South Affl Property Mgint,

OFFER TO PURCHASE
1.' PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of theproperty situated at

l ^ , . / ^ . ™

; Utah,

. County of.

ynnllrrft^t

subject to any restrictive, covenants, zoning r e g u l a r utility ot <nher easements or rights of way. governmentfcatents^orsta te deeds of record approvedI by^Buyerin
aco^ance 1
fl«.

^

Section G : Said.property is y ^ y - J ^ C

^mfi

a<;lah(lve

5

Barb^YE

_

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES:
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

^

I Vacant
_ Acreage
_. _ ^

D Vacamt Lot

B IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Commarcial

TersaV

*as sellers, and is

(

^

J

"

^

!

;

^

V
. Q Other.
.

K] Residential "iDCondo

•

Other _

.

^

(a) included Items. Unless excluded below, » * sale shall /nc/ude all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A ,f presently a t t a c h e d ' ^ property.
The following personal property shall also be riduded in tltk *ale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to t i t l e : K e t T l g e r a T O T
(b) Excluded Items. The following items are specifically e x c e e d from this sale:
.

.

.

. . .

.

.

.

.

.

.

-

~

-

~

u

*

•

-

-

• : • • •

•

<

;

•

'

•

:

Nrmft
;

•

•

\

*

-

^

:

:

(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. N„|| er represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price:
n..._..
r-,
:T
r-i ^A1___
DG
El
H aioT'triritv
electricity
E connected
• well
• connected*
D other
00 public sewer GQ connected/ <
D . ingress & egress by private easement
Q irriuAtlon water /secondary system
D septic jank
D connected .
D dedicated road D paved
# of ahitroc
Company
D other sanitary system
El curb and gutter
*
CJ TV antenna
D master antenna • prewired
B public water S connected
• other
rights
" •" ' •
fflnatuiaigas
09 connected
D private water D connected
(d) Survey. A certified survey B shall be f unwind at the expense oi

condition,except:

prior to closing, •

S e l l e r

as o u t l i n e d ]T p a r n y r a p 1 ) 7

—-

2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FIN/(NCING. The m l purchase puce for the property is

S l X

—-—

^ ^ ^

T
f

!

r

1 0 0 , 0 0 which represents the aforeoescrlbed EARr^ST MONEY D^OSIT:--

;

"~

h USan

ftI

Dollars ($ 6 4 f 0 0 0 . 0 0

$.
$:

shall not be furnished.

°

_) which shall be paid as follows:

.

representing the approximate balance ot CA§H DOWN PAYMENT at closing.
representing tne appru*nii« M—.«..~w V , V^^,-, I ^ , , , , ,^,.,.. t a ,,.._
„_
representing the approximate baitance of an exjsting mortgage, trust deed note,;real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears inter*** »i
which include:

D prince*.

_ j _ % p^ annumjwith monthly payments of $
D inttM„8t;

D taxes;

D insurance;

!

D condo fees;

.

D other

representing the approxima* bmlance ot * n additional existing mortgage,
trust deed
realpayments
estate contract
% per annum
with note,
monthly
of $. or other encumbrances to be
A1 ,v
assumed by Buyer, which d&rtgmtion beam Interest at _____ • • insurance;
———••«#«
•' " condo ~
fees;
• other.
wnicn inciuae:
L_J yi n •»*••—.
—- m " , , w i «
—•• *~™n —
which include:
• princes*.
D intt»n*8t;
• taxes
^ i ^ a M L i l O representing balance, if an,. ,nr..»uding p.vn^eds from a new Wtgage loan, or seller financing, to be pa.d as follows:

nf

tiP"

o f

r.'.ns.-im?—i

4^-*

•A

___

Other

$ 64.000.00

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE

-yerisrequired,oassumeanUnde^^^^^
8

to assume and/or procure same and this offer ,s n r f . .ub.ee to Buyer quahfymg for ^ ^ J ^
to maKe app.ication within _ £ l Y £
an interest rate not to exceed _2J>

n

days «~ Se.^r s acceptance of th,s « ^ * - £ £ >
% " * " " ' * » » « « qualify for the assumpfon and/or ^ ^

o, this Agreement, this Agreement sha„ be voida.* ,- , e option „, the Seller ^ ^ J - .
points, not to exceed S C 4 0 . 0 U
• In **«»"n, se»e, ngrees to pay $ M 0 . 0 0
,
..i„fr-i»4'--if-/'i
Seller s lnt«it-<>•,•) (.--/ )

c l
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u

™^-£-~20-?t
Datet_4=

8

J J
'

^ Z
"

^ , ^
to be used

n

B

o b l i g a t i o n and /or

obtain the new financing a,

J _ _ _ - _ f _ » * . after Seller's acceptance
x

^ ^ h e r
y

| o a n dJscount

loan costs.

Buyer's I n i t i a l s J ^ " ) . # )
-^

(VYfy
Date]

3. CONDITION AND C O N V ^ ^ C E OF TITLE, Setter represents thatj6el»er& holds title to the property in fee sim|_i B Is purchasing the property under a real
estate contract Transfer of Setter ^ ownership interest shall be made as setforth In Section S. Seller agrees to furnish 900a and marketable title to the property, subject
to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by* H a current'policy oftitleinsurance liTthelimount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current,
with an attorney's opinion (See Section H).
*1
'
*
irty prior to closing. Buyer shall take ti
" ~'s prior to signing this Agreement
1 Buyer
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:.

None

•- ~

Exceptions tq.Jhe above and Section C shall be limited to the following:

None
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offertemade subject to the following special conditions arid/or contingencies which must be satisfied

prior to 1*1^ (10 Approval by buyer of xxaSma^t
.structural, electrical, arid heatang systepis.
(21 Approval bv/buverton condition df svdjomink^pool, (31 Buyer obtaining adequate financing
at a rate of 9.5% or better.
* " »>?» »*
__,
^__________^_^
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed on or before

9T

. at a reasonable location to be designated by
..19
Setter, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shalt deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with
this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of G_ date of possession D date of closing • other
__
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer «en a t C l O S l n g
unless extended by written agreement of parties.
10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Agreement the listing agent 1 4 c D o U g a l - Q l s e n
.represents C ) Seller ( ) Buyer,
and the selling agent

S o u t h Am P r o p e r t y M g m t .

April

15

represents ( ) Seller (X) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement

written disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. {jfyftiS^

Buyer's initials 1W>) (£^i) Seller's initials.

11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVlSKW sifcTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN
ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.
12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME UMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
have until
:00
(AMfffift
F e b -M 2
6
m 5
_»:wu
(AMTPM)ren
z.u
MONEY to
//
to the
the Buyer.
Buyer. _^
er*s Signature)

_

(

D

a

t

, 119___k_,
9 9 1 r to
to accept
accc this offef^Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST
J
J
e

J

)

//^Ikzc.M

I

(Buyer's Signature)

Jvr Jy?iJ A y, 7-33.63 sn-u-

(Address)

JL

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE
• ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Setter hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the tenns and conditions specified above.
Q

REJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer

(Seller's initials)

\ ( l COUNTER OFFER. Setter hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until _
soocified below
^

<e< frsc
_

f

'.S

Hj*—1

U

-

t

Z--Z^-^/
(Setter's Signature)

-

/

V

*

_

————

J

6 tyg-ffrf .

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

ffimftl
(Time)

'

(AM/PM)

'

'•

'

< r

W, I

, 19

f

I

( Y

I J ,i.

$?&> <t&jxL,ne*rf

J.

,*_£

v

,^r

"•

to accept the terms

—:—;—

rfi& 8X&

(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

fArlrlrAft&l
(Address)

(Phone)

(SSN/TAX ID)

CHECK ONE:
D ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNtEft OFFER
*
. • REJECTION Buyer l\ereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER.
£ (Buyer's Initials)
. B COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum.

IpQN.
(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Buyer's Signature)

<T)crr\
-s*.
(Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement Bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed)
1
A. • I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement beanng all signatures
SIGNATURE OF BUYER

SELLEI
SIGNATURMF' SEl
~

\W+4

fov/T

2--gg-9/

"Kfe<

Date

IT

Date

B. D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on.
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the •

Date

-.19.

Seller Q Buyer. Sent by

Page three of a four page form
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-by

EARNEST^MONEY S/W3ES AGREEMENT
Legend

Yes (X) '

No (O)

This is a legally binding contract Read the entire document carefully before signing.

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sections)

0»*0«TV«MTV

A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating,
air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs.
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason
of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as
to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection,
said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer.
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not
or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall
be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well.serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and
continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right.
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller
has no knowledge of any needed repairs and ft meets all applicable government health and construction standards.
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally
approve the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case,
all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth
In Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void.
G. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion
or a preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defects) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties.
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing! Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
by such title insurance,company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any
cancellation charge
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior
to closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void.
J. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases
entered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer.

043
EXHIBIT
DA/5C A M C n c A CTUIO D A ^ C C O Q U

'A'

K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS.« Buyer oMSeiler is a co>porationrpartnershiprfrist j estate., oVotherentity, the person executing this Agreement on Its behalf warrants
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller.
" *
"" " % j / ' ~ : , ~
' " '
*L\-,
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constftutes the_entire agreement between-the parties and supersedes and cancels any
and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings oragreements^between the^parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agreer
v
u
ment. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. N
' *' *;r
-'
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing, and, If attached hereto, shall incorporate alt the provisions of this Agreement
not expressly modified or excluded therein.
~ *~; »
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Sellerror If (his sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any .of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may. arise or accrue YronTenforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit retired to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the Interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting £arty shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
foes incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action.
O. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement.
t

P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by thefcejleruntil closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
(10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transactionTT Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes,
fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing
date shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter,
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates'. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
delivered by all parties to the transaction.
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (te) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing
title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 6. Unearned deposits'On tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer
at closing.
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title "shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract,"Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed,
containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real
estate contract therein.
T. NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence
of the event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given
is automatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the'
Buyer or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice.
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office.
V. DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays.
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THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1, 1987

ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes:

( X ) a COUNTEROFFER

SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated t h e _ L 2

S t e p h a n i e Honrud

day of

(

) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY

Ffthniflry

. 19 9 1 , between

David

asbuyer(s).and Dale fr B a r b a r a Kersey

fi—

asseiier(s).

covering real property described as follows:

542Q South Knollcrest, Mirray, Utah
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of T H E AGREEMENT:

fll

Sales price to be $67.000.00 (2)

Approval by buyer on condition of

qtnirtirral, electrical, and heating systems, and swimming pool will he
provided by March 15, 1991,

(5) Buyer obtaining adequate finaTiriTig nt a

rate of 9.5% or better will remain as a contingency.

All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. (X ) Seller (

February 26

) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0

IQ 91 t o accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this A d d e n d u m shall lapse.

Date

Signature of (

Time

(A.M.^M

'S.CO p r V \

(A.M./P.M.)

?

) Seller ( X ) Buyer

^ ^

A?

^ '

^

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

Check One
(/§ I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above
( ) I hereby ACCEPT toe foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum

(

f
Signature
s*Z^*
) I hereby reject the fore"going

Signature

f \
^

(

) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing an
all signatujes^
signat

(Initials)

Date

Time

DOCUMENT RECEIPT

Signature of Buyer(s)
(

Date

y^

re of Seller(sf
Signature
Seller(s)

/<
f*

~DaYe

s

) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed Cm

19

, by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the (

) Seller (

) Buyer

Sent by
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission

'
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rii-cU IN ULfcNKo o m o c
Salt Lake County Utah

2 3 1992
N e i l R. S a b i n

(2840)

3y.

Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

~r^M

k 3rd Dist Court

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

H-I-^Q-^IMCL^

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,

anaoiao

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF PLAINTIFFS AND
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS

v.
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Civil No. 910904831CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment came on
regularly for hearing on the 2nd day of March, 1992, before the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge, presiding.

The Plaintiffs

appeared by and through Patricia L. LaTulippe, their attorney,
and the Defendants appeared by and through Franklin R. Brussow,
their attorney.
The Court has examined the pleadings and documents on file
herein, including the respective affidavits submitted by the
parties, and the documents on file herein, and heard oral
argument by counsel.

J/-4

The Court, further, having found and concluded that the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, which is the subject of this
action, is clear, unambiguous, and in full force and effect; that
this subject contract includes an express warranty from the
Defendants to the Plaintiffs as to the condition of the furnace;
the Defendants not having submitted to the Court any facts or
issues by Affidavit contradicting or countering the Plaintiffs'
Affidavits and the clear and express language of the subject
contract; and the Plaintiffs having incurred the cost of
$1,100.00 to replace the defective, warranted furnace; and the
Court otherwise having found that no dispute or issue of material
facts exist in this case; and that, accordingly, the Plaintiffs
are entitled by the express terms of the contract to Judgment
against the Defendants; now, therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are
granted Judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally:
1.

For $1,100.00.

2.

For Plaintiffs' costs incurred in this case.

3.

For reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the

Court, after submission by Plaintiffs to the Court and to
Defendants' counsel of a detailed and itemized statement.
DATED t h i s ^ ^

day of

Wvg^cU

, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

NE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

15699

-

2 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the x X

day of

March, 1992, addressed as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P. 0. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

15699

-

3

-

l"'j

.O IN CLERK o u m u -

Salt Lake County Utah

SEP 0 5 1992
Clerk 3rd 0<st Gmt

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO,

910904831

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant
to

Rule

4-501

of

the Utah

Code

of Judicial

Administration.

Specifically, plaintiffs have moved for an award of attorney's
fees and sanctions.

In response, defendants filed a "Response

to Motion Objection."

Plaintiffs filed a reply to defendants'

Response to Motion Objections and a Motion for Sanctions and a
reply to defendants7 Response to Sanctions.
Defendants requested a hearing on the motions, but they are
not

dispositive

motions,

argument necessary

and

the

Court

for the resolution

does

not

of these

deem

oral

issues.

The

Court, having considered plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees
and

costs,

and

for

sanctions,

the

defendants'

opposition

thereto, and for good cause shown, hereby rules as follows.

1 r4
JL w-

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

HONRUD V. KERSEY

The Court has reviewed the attorney's fees and costs and
finds

that

the

attorney's

fees

and

costs

requested

reasonable and were necessarily incurred in this action.
plaintiffs' motion

in this action

costs

with

is

granted

sanctions,

the

Court

respect

finds

that

for

to

attorney's

plaintiffs'

are
Thus,

fees and

motion

defendants' memorandum

for
in

opposition attempts to re-litigate matters already resolved in
this case and are without merit and that it was not brought in
good faith.

Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion

for sanctions and awards defendant additional attorney's fees
in the amount of $200.00.
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare an Order consistent with
this ruling.
Dated this

day of September, 1992,,, . XV'*~

ANNE M.'^
DISTRICT * CQ0&SF'* JUDGE

J.

»-• ^

HONRUD V. KERSEY

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

this

°

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

day of September, 1992:

Neil R. Sabin
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin R. Brussow
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

(ldX/utu« hM

IQCi
J. - v->

Salt Lake County Utah

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

SEP 2 ! 1992

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 910904831 CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA
KERSEY,
Defendants.

In this action, the Court granted Plaintiffs1 Motion for
Summary

Judgment, and

required

that

the

Plaintiff

Statement of *Vttorneys Fees and Costs to the Court.

submit

a

On April 10,

1992, Plaintiff submitted a statement to Defendants and to the
Court.

On May 8, 1992, Defendants filed a response and objection

to the Plaintiffs' Motion for fees and costs.
Plaintiffs'

filed

a

reply

to

the

On May 18, 1992,

Defendants'

Response

and

simultaneously filed a Motion for Sanctions. As the motions before
the Court were not depositive, the Court deemed oral argument

p.hon-ord

14 0

unnecessary

for resolution•

The Court, having examined the

pleadings and documents on file herein, including Plaintiffs'
Motion

for Attorneys Fees and Costs and

for Sanctions, the

Defendants' opposition thereto, and for good cause shown, hereby
finds Plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs to be reasonable and
necessarily incurred in this action• The Court also finds that the
Defendants ' Memorandum in Opposition attempts to relitigate matters
already resolved in this case, is without merit, and not brought in
good faith.

Now, therefore, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are granted
judgment against Defendant, jointly and severally, for their
reasonable attorneys fees and costs as submitted to the Court in
the

amount

of

Four

Thousand

One

Hundred

Fifty-One

Dollars

($4,151.00) as attorneys fees and Two Hundred Thirteen Dollars
Forty-Three Cents ($213.43) as costs. In addition, Plaintiffs are
granted their Motion for Sanctions and awarded an Order and
judgment against counsel for the Defendants, individually and
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) as attorneys fees.

DATED this ^>(*bV day of

V-^V^^W^

1992

ANNE M. STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUD

p.hon-ord
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
caused to be served upon:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P.O. 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
by mail, postage pre-paid this

M

day of September, 1992

p.hon-ord

\&c

'"•*
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL ^fflCTTTjf FOR THE COUNTY OF S A C T J ^ A p ^ jjy <^

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
ANSWER
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
JURY DEMAND
PROOF OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs,
v
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA

*

Case No. C 910704831

KERSEY,

JUDGE STIRBA

Defendants.

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW f
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

ER

# 5429

DEFENDANTS SAY:
COUNT 1

1.

Admitted.

2.
Denied,
for
the reason that same is untrue, since a
counter-offer was tendered to Plaintiffs on or about 20 February 1991,
which was purportedly accepted by the Plaintiffs on or about 22
February 1991.
3.
Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, Defendants having
expressly refused to extend any warranty to Plaintiffs, buyers, and
having specifically counter-offered in their own hand to Plaintiffs,
in lieu of any warranty, a right of inspection for Plaintiffs, limited
in time, and supported by consideration in the form of a price
reduction for the said refutation of any warranty.
4.
Admitted, in part, but denied that Plaintiffs relied on any
warranty or "representation
in the adhesion contract drafted by
Plaintiffs' own agent, sin ce Plaintif fs abided by the limitation in
Defendants' counter-offer wh ich was in 1 ieu of any warranty concerning
the condition of the premi ses, and, in conformity with the aforesaid
limitation, had the premises and furnace inspected by their own expert
who certified to Plaintiff s the fitness of the premises and furnace
and on whose representation of fitness the Plaintiffs actually relied
in conformity with the limita tion in the counter-offer they accepted.

5.
Neither admitted nor denied as to when Plaintiffs made
physical entry into or occupied the subject premises for lack of
Defendants' knowledge and Plaintiffs are left to their proofs, however
Plaintiffs admit a business record purports that a Mountain Fuel
representative refused to re-light the subject furnace on or about 20
April
1991.
6.
Denied, for the reason that same is untrue there being no
indication in any Mountain Fuel business record that the subject
furnace was releasing any "toxic gas", known and identified, nor that
the furnace was defective, or beyond repair, if repair was necessary.
It does appear that some presently unknown person of questionable
expertise purported to find a "flame disturbance" of unspecified
causation. Exhibit A.
7.
Denied, for the reason that same is untrue, said furnace
being found in proper and serviceable condition when same was cleaned
and serviced prior to the 1990-1991 heating season by an experienced
furnace service person hired by Plaintiffs and also when Defendants'
own
expert inspected the furnace in acceptance of the express
limitation
contained
in Defendants' counter-offer. Additionally,
Plaintiffs and their adopted son used the furnace up to and until the
date set for closing and suffered no toxic effects, the furnace being
in satisfactory working condition on the closing date.
8.
Denied, for the reason that this allegation is logically and
factually inconsistent since Exhibit A is dated 20
April
1991, and
since Plaintiffs waited almost thirty days before purportedly sending
a letter to Defendants on 17 May 1991 concerning the purported
"dangerous" condition. Defendants had amicably agreed upon Defendants
inquiry subsequent to the closing to demonstrate for Defendants how to
operate the swimming pool, sprinkler system and digital furnace
thermostat.
Defendants
appeared
at the pre-arranged time, but
Plaintiffs were absent and Defendants returned at a later date to
gratuitously assist Defendants, who made absolutely no reference to
the
furnace
being unsatisfactory. Still later, when Defendants
responded with instruction to assist Plaintiffs in understanding the
correct use of the refrigerator upon Plaintiffs' complaint, there was
no mention of any problem with the furnace.
9.
Denied, for the reason that even if Plaintiffs' inspector's
appraisal that the furnace was in satisfactory working can be proved
to be negligent and the furnace was not in satisfactory working
condition at closing, Plaintiff's are not entitled to the brand new
furnace, or the eleven hundred dollars ($1,100.00), they have been,
and are now, attempting to wrongfully dun Defendants to provide under
threat of suit and liability for attorney fees. Plaintiff's would only
be entitled to the repairs necessary to make the existing furnace
function satisfactorily, or to a used furnace that could so function.
10. Denied, for the reason that clause Nf as would all terms of
the
agreements between Plaintiffs and Defendants as drafted by
Plaintiffs, shall be construed against Plaintiffs and relates only to
failure to consumate the closing and instances where there is a
recission of the contract. Further denied, for Defendants in good

01 1

faith sought to resolve the controversy without litigation while
Plaintiff s in bad faith utilized counsel to gouge Defendants for an
entirely new furnace, dunned Defendants through counsel with threats
of the imposition attorney fees, made false representations of fact to
Defendants which caused Defendants to doubt Plaintiffs1 counsel's
veracity and to be wary of Plaintiffs, and the Defendants were
over-reached by Plaintiffs' counsel who refused to reasonably respond
to Defendants1 correspondence that sought to ascertain whether the
condition of furnace was as Plaintiffs and their counsel represented
before making overtures to fix or replace said furnace with a
satisfactory used furnace or to stand on Defendants1 rights to have
Plaintiff sustain the burden of proof. Plaintiffs' rush to the
courthouse is not reasonable and was unnecessary, hence attorney fees
for such activity are unreasonable. Should the reasonable attorney
fees portion of clause N apply, mutuality of remedies would require
Plaintiffs to pay Defendants' reasonable attorney fees when Defendants
prevail.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court hold
Plaintiffs' claim for naught, dismiss same as no cause of action, and
award Defendants their costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys/fees
so wrongfully incurred in defending this matter.
COUNT 2
12. Defendants incorporate
herein paragraghs 1-11 above.

by

reference

as

if fully set forth

13. Denied,
for
the reason that same is untrue, since a
counter-offer was tendered to Plaintiffs on or about 20 February 1991,
which was purportedly accepted by the Plaintiffs on or about 22
February 1991.
14.

Admitted, as did Defendants.

15.

Denied, for the reason that same is untrue.

16. Denied, for the reason that even if Plaintiffs could possibly
prove the furnace was in unsatisfactory condition at or before the
closing Plaintiff's are only entitled to a furnace in satisfactory
working
condition
not
a brand new furnace, or the $1,100.00
unreasonably
demand
and which the Plaintiffs wrongfully sought to
intimidate Defendants to provide through Plaintiffs' counsel.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court hold
Plaintiffs' claim for naught, dismiss same as no cause of action, and
award Defendants their costs, interest, and reasonable attorneys fees
so wrongfully incurred in defending this matter.

012

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1.

Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action.

2.
Plaintiffs1 contract is one of adhesion and such contract
also must be construed against Plaintiffs1 draftors thereby precluding
recovery.
3.
The express terms of Defendants' counter-offer as accepted by
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs1 course of dealing in reliance thereon
exclude any assertion of any warranty, since Plaintiffs purchased the
property in reliance upon the satisfactory results of their own
inspection.
4.
Plaintiffs have failed to join an indispensable party who is
bound to make contribution for the losses purportedly sustained by
Plaintiffs
should
Plaintiffs
be
able to prove the purported
unsatisfactory condition of the furnace existed at closing.
5.
In the alternative Defendants reserve the right to assert the
mutual mistake of the parties as to the condition of the furnace and
mutual mistake as to the existence of a warranty of said furnace
requiring the equitable recission of the contract between innocent
parties.
6.
Upon completion of discovery Defendants reserve the right to
add additional affirmative or special defenses.
7.
Upon completion of discovery Defendants reserve the right to
implead third parties to make contribution to, or indemnify Defendants
for, any judgment which might be obtained in this matter, as well as
the right to file such cross-claims against Defendants1 real estate
agent as may become warranted.
JURY DEMAND
Defendants hereby demand a trial by jury.

28 August 1991
FRANKLIN RICHARD ^frkUSSOW
Attorney for Defendants

')t

Form 184

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY
* . ^ -r- . ^ tOrder No

NOTICE
Name

Address ^r^o

Your

'OcL^>^/

A, l~*-££s: u^r rt?>

<j£tu^xs —/?

has been found to be in an unsafe operating condition and was shut off
at

f^:/f

AM.,<Pjp> because

^ ^ ^ < ?

This discontinuance of service does not indicate or imply that the
above appliance has been inspected for or is free of any defect other than
herein noted. It will be necessary for you to have your plumbing or heating
contractor make proper repairs, corrections and a complete inspection.
When the necessary repairs and/or corrections have been completed,
please notify Mt. Fuel Supply Company, phone £ / C ^ ^ ^ " ^
Signed —
Serviceman

Customer'ss
Signature

y;
y;

.

y/ " / , / , / / .

EXHIBIT A

Salt L ? , ^ County Utah

,°:D 23 1991
STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF S&LT LAKE

fk >rd Dot Court
DPOHtv r^

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v

PROOF OF SERVICE

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS
or

other

SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual
liability, Defendants hereby offer to Plaintiffs to have the

device

which

is

welding

to

achieve

Plaintiffs
($95.00),
Plaintiffs

the subject of the above-entitled matter repaired by
satisfactory

operation,

or, in the alternative,

offer

to

pay to Defendants the sum of ninety-five dollars

either

as

full

satisfaction of any and all claims against

associated with, arising out of or which could arise out of

the above-entitled matter.

20 September 1991
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW
Attorney for Defendants

.v
p^^V
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FllB>IH3THiSyc0tfliT
Third JucSicls? District

STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT

WF -1 1991
SALT LAKE COUNTY

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,

By.

WutyCterk

OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
v

PROOF OF SERVICE

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS SAY THAT, without admission of responsibility or
contractural or other liability, Defendants hereby offer to pay
to Plaintiffs
some of three hundred, seventy-five dollars
($375.00), as full satisfaction of any and all claims against
Plaintiffs associated with, or arising out of or which could
arise out of the above-entitled matter.

\fU6a*t&^

Date: 1 October 1991
FRANKLIN RICHAXB BRUSSOW
Attorney for Defendants

~IS.-£D

Dla.niOTOOURT
STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUIJIY QOFy S&LT LAKE

»5T

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD
fcWOFFER

OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
v

PROOF OF SERVICE

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS
or
sum

other

SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual
liability,

of

four

hundred

coupled

with

the

inspector,

is

half

Defendants hereby offer to pay to Plaintiffs the
and

$125.00
the

twenty-five dollars ($425.00), which, when
the

Plaintiffs have taken back from their

price of a new furnace installed pursuant to

the replacement bid provided by Plaintiff to Defendants.

/

30 October 1991
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW
Attorney for Defendants

r. 1 U
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE COUNTY jOT SALT ^LAKE
w

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,

o m rjj "3/

Br—

,Cs^Zs&~f~~z^

RESPONSE TO MOtlOJf FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT '

v
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 56

060

DEFENDANTS SAY:
1.
A jury trial was demanded in this case by Defendants so that
admissable,
relevant and material factual determinations may be
decided
by a panel of ordinary, reasonable people and justice
delivered by these peers in Court. URCP 43 (a).
2.
Genuine issues of material fact exist that are unresolved by
Plaintiff's
affidavit,
are
squarely
rebutted
by
Defendants'
counter-affidavit and Plaintiffs bear the burden of providing a
preponderance of reliable and admissable evidence in order to prevail
in this matter.
3.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment may not be supported
by
a
legally proscribed affidavit containing of out of Court
statements made by a un-named declarants offered as evidence to prove
the matters purportedly expressed since it is well recognized in the
antiquity of American and English jurisprudence that such statements
are inadmissable and unfit for submission to the trier of fact as
obviously lacking intrinsic reliability, especially when the opponent
is denied the fundamental due process protection of confrontation
embodied in the right to cross-examine the declarant as a witness
under oath in Court. Utah RE 802; URCP 56 (e) and 43 (a) & (b).
4.
The submission of inadmissable hearsay to a trier of fact is
strictly proscribed by Utah Rule of Evidence 802 as inherently
unreliable and a circumvention of the right to cross-examine the
purported declarant under oath at trial.
5.
Plaintiffs'
affidavit sets forth numerous out of Court
statements of un-named declarants who were not not subject to oath
when
they purportedly said the inadmissable hearsay Plaintiffs'
espouse in their supporting affidavit, "Averments 7, 8, 12, 18, 19,
22, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 24." In fact, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B (Averment
7) does not corroborate the existence of a "large split" or "the
release of toxic gas" as set forth as the unsubstantiated and unsworn
hearsay of an admittedly unknown declarant - Averment 12.
6.
Plaintiffs' affidavit avers out of Court statements of other
declarants that are not made upon Plaintiffs' own personal knowledge,
the "averments " set forth above in paragragh 5 are clearly hearsay
and inadmissable as evidence according to Utah RE 802, 801, and URCP
56 (e) and Plaintiffs are not competent to testify as witnesses,
expert or otherwise, as to the truth of those "facts" set forth in the
affidavit.
7.
Plaintiffs Averment 22 is strangely absent a paid invoice for
the new furace Plaintiff's demanded from the onset and the affidavit
of Plaintiffs' counsel is likewise absent the breakdown of hourly
services
allegedly provided especially where Plaintiff's counsel
purported in writing that her accumulated fees before generating the
Motion for Summary Judgment were $1,400.00.

oei

Plaintiffs' affidavit was made in bad faith, clearly and
obviously contrary to the express requirements of URCP 56 (e) and RE
802, to avoid the recognition that Plaintiffs1 lack the necessary
proofs to prevail at trial in this matter, as an unwarranted and
clearly unsupported procedural attempt to strip the Defendants of
their right to a fair trial, and to needlessly and wastefully increase
the expense and costs to the Defendants and delay the trial of this
matter.
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request this Honorable Court:
a.
deny Plaintiffs'Motion for Summary Judgment in toto; and
b.
order an award to be paid to Defendants by Plaintiffs of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the Plaintiffs1
affidavit caused Defendants to incur, including reasonable
attorney's fees pursuant to URCP 56 (g) before Plaintiffs be
permitted to proceed any further with the above-encaptioned
matter.
/
/ „
*-*'<T? ~
DATE: 23 December 1991

.. -••— y' L/Z S ! > C K A / JC>C U; SJ ' V
FRANKLIN RICHARD ^RUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

T ^ C ^ ^ V

STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT iAKE

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
Plaintiffs,
v
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

AFFIANT SAYS:
1.
I am a Defendant and the Seller of my home in 5420 South
Knollcrest, Salt Lake City to Plaintiffs above.
2.
At no time did I offer to warrant a furnace at that
residence, nor did I so warrant. In the adhesion Offer to Purchase,
Contingency 1(e) drafted by the Plaintiffs/Purchasers, Plaintiffs
expressly accepted the property which is the subject of the sale
according to paragraph 7.
3.
It was my understanding that paragraph 7 was expressly
drafted and included to clearly supersede the general boilplate
language and adhesive provisions of Plaintiffs* form contract.
4.
This contract should be construed against Plaintiffs, because
of the inherent confusion caused by the contradictions of Contingency
1(e) negating warranties, written counter-offer of 20 February 1991
under paragraph 12 of the agreement,
"as is" paragraph B of the
Earnest Money Sales Agreement and Plaintiffs' mainfest acceptance of
that inspection contingency in lieu of warranties by hiring an expert
inspector before closing contrasted with paragraph C of the Earnest
Money Sales Agreement and the circuituous contradiction of paragraph
6.
5.
Paragraph 7 abrogated any warranty and provided Plaintiffs
the right to have the property inspected by an expert to assure the
fitness of the premises and Plaintiff's availed themselves of this
right shortly before the closing, finding the property fit as it was.
6.
The handwritten counter-offer under paragragh 12 also negated
the provision of any warranty and that Plaintiffs were bound to take
the
subject
propery
subject to their own inspection and ALL
contingencies were expressly removed before closing so that sale would
be
a clean deal and I would have no subsequent contingencies
associated with the sale to linger into the future.

7.
That paragragh 6 says "None" and "None" was a further
assurance in my mind that there were no warranties that would be a
subsequent contingency to drag me back into a closed deal.
8.
I expressed to the realtor that the sale was to be "as is" so
the matter would be ended with the sale and further lowered the price
to the point where I made no profit to close the matter with no loose
ends like the subsequent operation of contingencies like a lingering
warranty.
9.
On knowledge and belief, Plaintiff's were assured by their
expert that the home and the furnace were in proper working order by
their expert, relied on same, and later forced the expert/inspector to
return the fee paid the inspector through Plaintiffs1 attorney.
10. The furnace was in satisfactory working condition when the
gas to the premises was turned off on the day set for the closing.
11. The furnace was clean and serviced in November of 1990 by Mr.
Sorenson a reputable furnace service person who found the furnace to
be in proper working condition and I lived on the premises safely with
my wife and our newly adopted child.
12. I netted no profit from the sale of this premises which I
bought in 1983 and only sold the home when it became too small upon
our adoption of a Korean child.
13. After
the
sale
I responded immediately to Plaintiffs
complaint about the refrigerator and reminded Plaintiffs that stocking
a refrigerator with warm food from the store requires a reasonable
period of time for the refrigerator to overcome the warmth and
maintain the cold.
14. After the closing I agreed to come to the premises to show
the Plaintiff's how the sprinkler system, swimming pool system and
digital thermostat worked.
15. In spite of my efforts to assist the Plaintiffs, they waited
more than thirty days after purportedly discovering the alleged defect
in the furnace and never contacted me to negotiate a reasonable
resolution to the purported problem. Instead Plaintiffs hired an
attorney who demanded a brand new furnace, threatened to sue me, and
indicated I would have to pay for her fees. This letter was sent to
the realtor not directly to me.
16. Upon being dunned like this I became suspicious, and the
attorneys lack of candor in the responses to my correspondence only
made me more skeptical. Exhibit A contains the reasonable efforts I
made to resolve this matter short of litigation.
17. After mailed correspondence dated 15 July 1991, EXHIBIT A, to
Plaintiffs' counsel indicating that Plaintiffs' own inspector had
found no defect and waited for a response. I heard nothing.
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18.
On or about 13 August 1991 Plaintiffs' counsel sued me, and I
was forced to hire an attorney to defend me on a matter which could
have been negoitated between the parties.
19.
My attorney made reasonable efforts to negotiate this matter
to an economical conclusion, EXHIBIT B, however Plaintiffs' demanded
of me more and more money for Defendants' attorneys putting a
settlement out of reach.
20.
Offers of Judgment were served on Plaintiffs to no avail,
which included up to half the price of a brand new furnace for this
thirty-three year old, or so, home.
21.
After the sale was concluded and Plaintiff's bought the house
which was originally listed at $71,900.00 for $67,000.00, Plaintiffs
wish to chisel out a better deal, when a complaint about the purported
condition of the furnace can no longer be negotiated in consideration
of the sale price of the premises and Plaintiffs unfairly continue to
demand a brand new furnace and exorbitant attorney fees.
22.
Plaintiffs' counsel assessed her attorneys fees at $1,400.00
before she filed Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, EXHIBIT B,
but now states her fees have swollen to $3,620.50. At $75.00 per hour
that would be about 29.5 to submit a simple motion for summary
judgment.
23.
Plaintiffs' counsel's affidavit no where indicates on what
date, what service was purportedly performed and how much time each
service purportedly consumed, nor if counsel, a law clerk or paralegal
performed such services.

STATE OF UTAH
}ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
DALE B. KERSEY, being duly sworn, deposes and says that I have
read the paragraghs above, and if called as a witness have personal
knowledge of those facts contained therein and can testify they are
true, except as to those stated to be upon knowledge and belief, and
as to those facts I believe them to be true.
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Commission
v ' \\
Expires July 2,1992

Subscribed and sworn to
before me, a Notary Public,
on 23 December 1991

JANYCEA.SYNDERGAARD
lotary Public
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
My Commission Expires:
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Patricia
L.
LaTulippe
Mis!sen 4 Seriior
Suite 1100 Eagle Gate
60 E South Temple

Dear Us,

Flaza

.a t ui i poe *

i taixec
-Mivn torn r'hi^ios
wztn ;±±, aria he state*: ne reporter
in nis
inspection
thav the furnace *as in average condition*
He also statec
to m*
that,
mile
even using mirrors
during his inspection
not see any
t he lid
flame disturbance
or any other problem with the furnace.
This
inspection
supports
the save fincmgs
as that of the company I haa clean and
service
the furnace
in November of last
"/ear.

•j i n c e r e i v 1

Barbara

& Dale

Kersey

cc:

& Hrs.

Hon rue

Mr,

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
0

6G

A/-/&

Jul/ S, 1991

Patricia L. LsTjiippe
Nisisan %> Senior
Suits 11CO Eagl= Eate clazi
60 £ 5cutf. Temple
L= ffc!
e L/I-V,
Ci-/, Li
So* t
- L.sf
_C*t-i
Dear Us, LaTulipps:
I aE'SH /cu in »ii> Letter dates Ijra 7 : h 1991, ZQ prisms i-e « : "
address BHC prions n^mDer CT the inspector the Hcn^uc = ri^ec tc inspect nnou.se orior T O sale. Your letter aated Jane list has z^e name z* the
company as "Til" anc an address of "iOZf East Eth £ G L " " . Trz»-z is ^c
mention o+ cit/ or even a ohons -nj^be^'
I f-iec to lool- the* uc in m>
eitns- the white pages or the
the onlv list:rg tne> had tin
Hill Drive. I cslled tnem at
Cc-sf-ucticn Company d«ild:nc

phcre b o o s~c co-Ic not -in: s~ - listing :yellow cages. I tried A""-."* ir-:T,5:::r ana
Utah* ^a= -or a comoen* m Sunset at 77C Ecge
S85~44fo and was toic tr.e-- were a" >austr:el
pcwe-" plants z~3 die nc: do nc.se :nspectiora,

"lease provide me wit" the comolete indorsation I *-e ceen as-:-g i r so ensI can Tina c-t the information I need to ir^e sure c+ m> necessa-v actions.
Please ^espeno qjiirly to this second request,
Smce-eU ,

Ba^oara y Dale r e-"sey
ccs Mr. ?< Mrs. .^on^ad
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MIELSEN
E

<S£ ENIOR
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Gary A. Weston
Earl Jay Peck
Neil R. Sabin
Milton J. Morris**
R. Dennis lckes»t
Mark H. Anderson*
B. Kent Ludlow
Richard M. Hymas
John K. Mangum
Richard K. Hincks
Noel S. Hyde
Robert P. Faust
Jay R. Mohlman
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Larry L. Whyte*
Steven F. All red©
Amy A. Jackson
Patricia L. LaTulippe

Attorneys & Counselors
Since 1882

Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower

A Professional Corporation

60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913

Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925)
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965)
Senior Counsel
Hugh C. Garner
Of Counsel
Raymond T. Senior

July 10, 1991

Licensed to Practice in
© Arizona
* California
+ Navajo Bar
* New York
* Washington, D.C.

Dale and Barbara Kersey
6942 Well Spring Road
Midvale, Utah 84047
Dear Mr. and Ms. Kersey:
Please excuse the typo on my l a s t l e t t e r .
The inspection
company i s TCI, The Complete Inspection.
I t i s located a t 1025
East 8th South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The telephone number
l i s t e d in the yellow pages under "Inspection Service" i s 3289083.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Patricia

LaTulippe

PLH/ts
encl.
13293.H0583.PLH
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NIELSEN
S&ENIOR
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Arthur H. Nielsen
Gary A. Weston
Earl jay Peck
Neil R. Sabin
Milton J. Morris**
R. Dennis lckes«t
Mark H. Anderson*
8. Kent Ludlow
Richard M. Hymas
John K. Mangum
Richard K. Hincks
Noel S. Hyde
Robert P. Faust
Jay R. Mohlman
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Larry L. Whyte •
Steven F. All red©
Amy A. Jackson
Patricia L. LaTulippe

Attorneys & Counselors
Since 1882

Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower

A Professional Corporation

60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925)
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965)

Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913

Senior Counsel
Hugh C. Garner
Of Counsel
Raymond T. Senior

J u l y 8, 1991

Licensed to Practice in
® Arizona
* California
t Navajo Bar
* New York
* Washington, D.C.

Dale and Barbara Kersey
6942 Well Spring Road
Midvale, Utah 84047
Dear Mr. and Ms, Kersey:
On the day the Honruds moved in, they were told by Mountain
Fuel that the furnace was unsafe and inoperable. They bargained
for a functioning furnace and are merely trying to get what they
paid for. They are not out to gouge anyone.
We have indicated that the property is available for your
inspection. The Honruds only ask that they be given 24 hours
notice. As I represented in the June 21, 1991 letter, we do not
feel it necessary to have other service people present at the
time of your inspection.
If after you have had the furnace
inspected, a question remains as to the operative condition of
the furnace, we will obtain another opinion at that time.
Letters back and forth restating the same position will not
solve the problem. We expect an inspection to be conducted and a
resolution within five (5) days from receipt of this letter. If
this does not occur, we will immediately file a complaint with
the court. Let me reiterate that we would prefer to resolve this
out of court.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Patricia L. LaTulippe
PLH/ts
13241.H0583.PLH
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Jul> 4, 1991

Patricia L. LaTuiippe
Nielsen b Senior
Suits liOO Eagie Gate Flaza
60 E South Temple
Salt Lale City, UT 84111
Lear pis, LaTuIippe;
I have receive- information cont^ar/ to year letter of JLPS 21, 1991,
indicating Mctntam Fuel was at the property after the first tu*r or- .isit,
It is important we be forthright abcit thi = 'T.atte-, si-ce I 5m ccrce^-ec
about o e m g go^gec fo-~ a ne* furnace.
v^ihy ie Mountair Fuel
Mountain Fuel -vorJs"not 5 to iz leal- , or
to sell, and install

bac? pedaling.
The notice only ma^es claim some
of questionable acilit/ fcunc a "-lame disturoance,,{
damaged casing. It i= also clea5-* Jritsn Furnace wenc =
a new furnace -atrier then f:; ing the ole one.

Can TI2 indicate *ren this o-acl- ccu-^ed. wn\ jidn t ""II *epc^t cr ictice
the crec 1 . Can ^CLntair F U E I " fty -urnzce
=6-v:cs pe^sc- QPse*"\ec nc
crac^.
I believe it is important to ^av^ all tnose people presert *ho rendered
opinions concerning tne furnece and its unrepai"-aoilit> to reach a consensus
on this -natter.
Do you tia^/e any suggestions concerning such a meeting"* Concerning ancche-opinion, the burden ne^e is not on me. Aisc undef- t~e contract tre hon^.ds
wculq be liable for all costs in resolving c m s .natte^ i+ /ou and tie/ a^e
wrong. Incidentally, I am merely required to proviae a furnace that wc-->=,
if you are correct or prevail, not a new +urr.ac5. Also, we may need to
discuss the potential of my na\ing the prope^t/ taci- , si~ce both tne ronr_.es
and ourselves may have oeen miatafen about the ^jr-acs
and I wotld not ^ave
discounted the listed price, as deeoly as I did, if I l new it *a= going tc
cost me one thousand dollars for a new furnace.
It nas tal-er you two wee!- a to respond tc m> lette^ c* J m e 7 ? 1*91.
Sincerely,

Dale t Barbara Jersey
:c.

Curtia flcDougal
McDougal 01 ae" Realty
Jim Pod--ig_ei South Am F_operty hanadsment
Dave axe* Stephanie Honrud
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Dale and Barbara Kersey
6942 Well Spring Road
Midvale, Utah 84047
Dear Dale and Barbara:
discovered that Mountain
Upon inquiryf I have QISCUVCICU ^*
will not supply the name of the inspector or allow him to
come out to the property again. However, this should not
impede our settlement because we have their notice of
discontinuance which makes clear there is a problem with
the furnace. We can verify the specific problem by private
inspection.
In answer to the questions raised in the June 7, 1991
lecter,
both the furnace inspector fromFurnace
Mountain and
Fuel Air
and
- r
of
cost
•
•
*
^
^
a
r
^
and
Air
for the
the
representative
from
United
the
Conditioning, who submitted a bid
not
replacement, indicated that there was a crack in
furnace casing. As to the type of gas escaping, we do
know anymore than rhat "che Kouncaiu Fuel representative
of
indicated it was toxic.
TIC, 1025 East "8th South,
not
performed
the initial
inspection before purchase
Provision #7 which provides for approval by the buyer the structural, electrical and heating systems does
negate your express warranty that the heating system would
for
be in working order at closing.
The Honruds will make the property avai
inspection upon 24 hours notice from you. You can arrange
to have a furnace service representative inspect the
furnace to verify the problem. We expect this inspection
not
to take place within the next seven (7) days. We dc
If
feel it necessary to have other service people present
oft jthe
furnace
after
inspection
dispute the condition o
nfl
Lu^
opinion
and go
you will need to obtain, anot^er^ndepend^ ^ P ^
furnace
we
"there. However, let me
from
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"as is" is not functional, i.e. Mountain Fuel will not turn
it on, and that under the contract you are liable for the
costs in resolving this matter.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Patricia L. LaTulippe
PLH/ts

June 7, 1991

Patricia L. LaTuuppe
Nielsen & Senior
Suite 1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
50 E South Temple
Salt Lake city*, UT 34111
Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
Although the temperature has turned to a delightful 30 degrees, due to the
serious nature of the problem, we are responding to your letter in a timely
manner, working towards a fast resolution.
We requested of you to furnish us immediately with the name and phone number
of the person who represented to you that the furnace was emitting toxic
gas. Your second letter does not include this information and it was the
Qiiij thing I asked of you. Please provide this- information immediately. If
you would have furnished us this information with your first letter, we
could have responded more satisfactorily. You did provide us with a copy of
the Mountain Fuei Notice of Discontinuance, but it provides no name of the
inspector. Also the Notice of Discontinuance states only "Flame
disturbance," says nothing about a large crack down the middle of anything
or the fact that it is releasing any toxic gas. What is cracked? what was

We also request you at this time to furnish us with the name, address and
phone number of the Hcnrud's inspector, who they had inspect the house upon
their demand. According to the Ernest Money Agreement, the sale of the
house was pending upon "approval by buyer of condition of structural,
electrical, and heating systems," which was accepted by the Honruds when
they closed. Wouldn't the Hcnrud's inspector have noticed such an obvious
infirmity as a large crack?
The special, express language in Clause 7 supersedes the form language in
Clause C. The Honruds chose the inspection expressly in lieu of the
warranty in Clause C. Why would the Honruds need the assurance D£ the
warranty, since they chose instead to have their inspector inspect the
premises to certify its fitness, why aren't you seeking compensaticn from
the expert inspector on whose assurances they relied?
We are interested in resciving this matter and would appreciate your prompt
response to our requests listed above. Also, you can arrange a joint
inspection so I might have your inspector, the Mountain Fuei employee, and
I will have the furnace service representative, who I had service arA sdjus:
this furnace on November 17, 1990, there also.
Sincerely,

Barbara h Dale Kersey
cc:

Mr. k Mrs. Hunrud
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Dale and Barbara Kersey
6942 Well Spring Road
Midvale, Utah 84047
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kersey:

' _

Y^L
i

Due to the serious nature of the problem and the need for a fast
resolution, the Honruds have asked for my assistance.
In response to your concerns raised in your letter, the Earnest Money
Agreement, although provided by the Honrud's agent, was signed by you and
is a binding contract. You are correct in your reference to clause #7 and
clause B. However, clause B provides that buyer accepts the property "as
is" subject to the warranties in Section 6.
Section 6 encompasses the
warranties contained in Section C. As I explained in my first letter,
you, the seller, warrant in Section C that the heating system is sound or
in satisfactory working condition, which it is not. Therefore, you are in
breach of the warranty you gave to the Honruds.
Mountain Fuel informed Honruds that the furnace was releasing toxic
gas, had a large crack down the middle and was not functional or safe in
that condition.
Copies of both Mountain Fuel's Notice of Discontinuance
and United Furnace's estimation of replacement were enclosed in che first
letter.

You can contact both Mountain Fuel and United Furnace to verify the
condition of the furnace. You can also engage your own people to inspect
the furnace and we will make the premises available. The Honruds are very
much interested in resolving this matter and appreciate your prompt
response.
Payment for the repairs is required immediately.
Please
contact me.
Sincerely,
NIELSEWL& SENIOR

€

-;1ay 31,

2 991

Dave arid Stephanie
5420 Knoll
Crest
Hurray,
UT
34107
Dear

ilr,

ana

Mrs,

Honrud

Honrud

and

Attorney

:

It is
unfortunate
that
you did
not contact
me immediately
concern ing
the
purported
"disturbance"
at the premises,
1 received
your
letter
dated
the
17th of Hay, postmarked
the 25th
of May* on the 30th
of Hay* at my
residence
of 69^2 tie 11 Spring
Road* Hid vale,
Utah 34047,
advising
me 1 nave
7 cays
t :>
respond.
This
causes
me to question
your intent
from to
onset,
In
the
pastf
you
contacted
me concern ing the refrigerator
anc
amicably
resolved
that
misconception
you had.
Then you contacted
me about
the
where
abouts
of
one of
the garage
door openers
anc that
matter
was also
resolved
to your satisfaction.
Now, without
contacting
me at all*
you choose
to run
off
to an attorney
and incur
that
expense
unreasonably
with
no contact
to me
at all.
tihat
is most
strange
anc
unsettling
is
that
1 readily
made
the
premises
available
for
your
inspection
an c
vou
in fact
had your e x D e r t
certify
to you the soundness
of the premises,
including
the
heating
system
and the
pool
(see
dlause
#7),
When you hao experienced
a
misunderstanding
as to the operation
of the pool
system,
1/ although
having
no
obligation
to
you,
came
over
and
instructed
you properly*
At the same time
I
instructec
you on how the sprink1er
system
worked
and how to program
the
t imer,
p1us I
also
instructed
you on how to program
the heating
system
thermostat.
You purchased
the premises
"as is"
(see
clause
3).
such an inspect
ion and relied
on the reoresentaiions
1 were
aware of
any defect
in the heating
system*
without
incident
all
winter,
J would
have had
the
mearly
added
it into
the purchase
price.

You availed
yourself
of that
inspector.
which
I used safely
deficiency
repaired

1 had
the
house
listed
for
$69*500
and
sold
it to
reduction
based
on your s and your
expert"s
inspection
knew,
or
should
have known,
this
house
was approximately
old,
yet you demand
a new heater
anc offer
no
contribution
and
installation,
four attorney
says
•"'urnace
approximately
exposed
my wife
and

that
"the
furnace
was re leasing
7 years
with
no incident
and
chosen
child
to any
danger.

toxic
certainly

of
If
anc
anc

you for
$67,000,
a
of
premise.
Ycu
more than 30
-/ears
to
its
purchase
gas,"
1 used
would
not
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Please
tell
me who
represented
to you that
this
furnace
was
gas.
Are they
willing
to testify
vo thai- in a court
of law?
inquiry
of
that
person
to ascertain
whether
the furnace
is
You don't
junk
an automob ile
because
it needs
new
tires.

emitting
I wish
beyond

vo

toxic
make
repair*

Incidentally,
the emest
money
document
was
provideo
by
your
agent
and
completed
by him.
Please
provioe
me the information
I seek
ana lets
resolve
your proolem
reasonably
in a fashion
like
che other
demands
you have vade on
me
after
the
deal
was
closed.
Please
correspond
iR^tiLiiilLS.
t»ith me
concerning
this,
the heating
season
is
over.
Sincere

1y,

Da 1 e dt 3ar bar a Ker se y
cc:

Curtis

>1cDouaal
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Attorneys & Counselors
Since 1882

Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower
60 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913

A Professional Corporation
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925)
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965)
Senior Counsel
Hugh C. Garner
Of Counsel
Raymond T. Senior

May 17,

1991

Licensed to Practice in
® Arizona
* California
t Navajo Bar
* New York
* Washington, D.C

Dale and Barbara Kersey
c/o Curtis McDougal
McDougal-Olsen Construction
1588 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Re:

Sale of home at 5420 S. Knollcrest

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Kersey:
We are representing Dave and Stephanie Honrud concerning the
real estate transaction between you and them.
Shortly after
closing when the Honruds attempted to have Mountain Fuel turn on
the gas, they discovered the furnace to be in an unfit and
dangerous condition. At this time, the gas company informed the
Honrud's that the furnace was releasing toxic gas and had a
"flame disturbance".
Because of this, Mountain Fuel will not
turn on the gas until the furnace is replaced. We have enclosed
a copy of Mountain Fuel's Notice of discontinuance of service.
Under Section C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, you,
as the sellers, warranted that the heating system is sound or in
satisfactory working condition at closing.
The contract also
provides for attorney's fees and costs upon default.
We are
suggesting that you voluntarily agree to replace the furnace and
pay the costs incurred by the Honrud's thus far to avoid
additional substantial expense.
Please find enclosed one estimate of replacement cost from
the United Furnace and Air Conditioning Company. The Honruds are
willing either to allow you to arrange for the furnace
replacement or to make the arrangements themselves. Of course,
if you choose to make the arrangements yourself, the Honruds will
need assurances that a reputable company is installing a good
furnace.
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Dale and Barbara Kersey
May 17, 1991
Page 2

Due to the serious nature of this problem, we expect an
immediate reply within seven (7) days.
Please feel free to
contact us with any questions or concerns.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

PLH/ts
encl.
12825.NI211.PLH
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P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
29 October 1991
P. LaTulippe, Esq.
Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eaqle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Honrud v Kersey
C91- 4831

Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
Thank-you
for
correspondence.

your

correction

concerninq

the

date

of

my

last

There is no fru stration concerninq the Kerseys' reasonable approach to
the resolution of this case, the payment of half the cost of a new
furnace accordi ng to the bid price first presented by Plaintiffs'
counsel to the Kerseys, includinq the money your clients took back
from the inspe ctor. What is frustratinq is a jump in Plaintiffs*
attorney fees of $600.00 for services requirinq an expenditure of
about one hour and your own mischaracterization in writinq of the
previous writte n bid you provided. The Kerseys did not depart from
their prior as sertions, Plaintiffs' counsel did affirmatively, in
writina.
Plaintiffs, from the onset, pushed the Kerseys, throuah counsel, for a
new furnace, not a reasonable settlement and you're riqht, that hasn't
chanqed. It was the Plaintiffs who denied the Kerseys an attempt to
repair the furnace.
It was the Plaintiffs who refused to contact the Kerseys to promptly
and reasonably discuss the furnace with the Kersey's and resolve the
matter between the parties from the onset, and who instead chose to
wait thirty days and sustain the expense of counsel to negotiate that
which could have been resolved without the intervention of counsel,
the needless institution of a lawsuit and the increase in Plaintiffs'
expenses. The Plaintiff's leqal fees have put the settlement of this
case out of reach.
Do what you will. Herewith find our Defendant's last offer of judgment
consistent with my word.
Yours/truly,

Franklin Richsfrd Brussow

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT
- J O
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
OFFER OF JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs,
V

PROOF OF SERVICE

DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE STIRBA

FRANKLTN RICHARD BPU^SOW, # 5429
Attorney lor Defendants
P.O. Box 2170 5
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS
or
sum

other

SAY THAT, without admission of responsibilty or contractual
liability.

of

four

hundred

coupled

with

the

inspector,

is

half

Defendants hereby offer to pay to Plaintiffs the
and

$125.00
the

twenty-five dollars ($425.00), which, when
the

Plaintiffs have taken back from their

price of a new furnace installed pursuant to

the replacement bid provided by Plaintiff to Defendants.

30 October 1991
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW
Attorney for Defendants
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PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
I ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
FRANKLIN
on

30

of

Judgment

RICHARD

BRUSSOW, beina duly sworn, deposes and says that

October 1991 the undersigned served a copy of Defendants' Offer
on

Plaintiffs'

attorneys at their business addresses by

depositina same in the U.S. Mail, First Class postage pre-paid
e-paid.

X7

^FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW
Subscribed and sworn to
before me, a Notary Public,
on n 30 October 1991

CHf**ft3?*'to

J

,Notary Public
Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires: /////
/rf^
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P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake Cityr UT 84121
24 September 1991
P. LaTulippe, Esq.
Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
RE:

Honrud v Kersey
C91- 4831

Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
Having reviewed your correspondence to me dated 17 October 1991, I am
greatedly concerned about the direction in which this matter is
heading. As Plaintiff's demand that the Kersey's pay attorney fees
mounts, the parties are further apart.
While you indicate that you had informed me by telephone that
Plaintiffs1 attorney fees were "approximately $800.00", that you had a
conversation with your clients, reviewed my submissions and sent me
correspondence, the amount of your attorney fees has grown $600.00 for
those services to approximately $1,400.00. The Kersey's refuse to pay
attorney fees for a matter that could have been negotiated by the
parties had the Honruds promptly contacted the Kerseys to negotiate a
settlement rather than juxtaposing the expense of attorney fees after
waiting more than thirty days to object to the putative defect.
Your 17 October 1991 correspondence indicates that the Honruds had a
furnace installed for $1,330.00, strangely you included the bid of
United Furnace to install a furnace complete for $1,090.00 with your
pervious correspondence of 17 May 1991. You will note I relied on your
representation in Defendants Answer, paragraph 9.
Your correspondence of 17 October 1991, apparently to close the gap
between the $1,090.00 bid and the $1,330.00 Plaintiffs alleged they
paid for some furnace, states "As we previously discussed, a new
furnace had been estimated to cost $1,200.00 ..." That statement is
untrue and is contradicted by your previous correspondence and exhibit
you
referenced therein which underscore the inaccuracy of that
assertion. I have spoken to you in the past about what my clients
perceived as inaccuracies in statements made to them and they were
explained and accepted as mis-communications from the Honruds.
At this juncture I am confused about obvious disparities in what you
assert was said in negotiations and what your own writings contradict.
I
must
disavow your characterizations of the our most recent
conversation concerning this case as expressed in your correspondence
of 17 October 1991.

f
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a

The increase in the presently stated cost of replacement price over
the previous bid of United Furnace consumes the $300,00 "contribution"
the Plaintiff's claim to be making to settle this matter. Plaintiff's
offer merely places the Kersey's further back from where they began
and facing Plaintiff's inflating attorney fees, as well as the cost of
protecting themselves.
the Fiam* , , .-> rejected the Kersey's offer to weld •_*> split
at the front seam <. ! m - furnace, the Kerseys offer $425.00, half the
price of the furnace as bid when coupled with the check Plaintiff's
took back from their inspector, or $125.00. The total would be
$550.00. You did indicate the TIC check remains uncashed " think ?
U.WULM.I

I am reiterating that perhaps the realtors could be induced to
contribute to the settlement, howeverr at the rate the Honrud's demand
for attorney fees increases, this might be fruitless in satisfying
part of the cost because of the attorney fees Plaintiff's continue to
demand. Please advise me concerning Plaintiffs' position, since the
Kersey's
reject
any o f f er t ha t i nc1ude s a c o ntr i but ion t o wa i d
Plaintiff^' attoi: i i e y f e e s .
Yours truly,

Franklin Richard Brussow
Attorney for Defendants
rt r* •

ersey

P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, UT 34121
24 September 1991
P. LaTulippe, Esq.
Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 34111
RE:

Honrud v Kersey
C91- 4831

Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
On or about 1 October 1991. I dispatched a second offer concerning
settlement of the matter referenced above. 1 understand you made
contact
with my office indicating that your clients had begun
installation of a new heater. You have not expressed your clients'
acceptance or rejection of the last offer made by the Kerseys.
Kindly indicate Plaintiffs' position on the last offer in writing so
there will be no confusion between the parties as to whether a
negotiated settlement of this matter might still be possible. The
Kerseys'pending offer is still open.
At this juncture I can indicate to you en behalf of the Kerseys that
they cannot accept the Plaintiffs' nebulous offer of 24 September
1991, as there is no sum certain stated in the offer and a party may
not
be
expected
to
accept
an open-ended settlement for an
indeterminate amount. The Defendants continue to feel that Plaintiffs
incurred attorney fees as a result of their own unwillingness to
promptly contact the Kerseys to resolve this matter without the
needless threat of the institution of litigation and intervention of
attorneys.
To date the Plaintiffs have almost half the cost of a new warranteed
furnace, which would have a projected life of thirty to thirty-five
years, in the form of the inspection fee that they took back from
their inspector and the monetary offer of the Kerseys.
Please advise me concerning Plaintiffs' position on the last offer, or
provide
the Defendants the Plaintiff's counter-offer for a sum
certain as my clients have no way to ascertain their financial
exposure, if they choose to accept Plaintiffs' last offer.
Yours truly,

Franklin Richard Brussow
Attorney for Defendants
cc: D. & B. Kersey
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT,nLAKE
" ; -„,jr

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

DEMAND FOR HEARING
OBJECTION TO REPLY
Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

DEFENDANTS' DEMAND FOR HEARING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO URCP 56
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY

nai

DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS' DISPOSITIVE MOTION
HAVING PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' REPLY
DEFENDANTS SAY:
1.
The Plaintiffs' discussion of the law is premature where
Defendants' Affidavit rebuts crucial facts which, when submitted in
evidence, would tend to cause a jury to conclude that it is more
likely than not that:
a.
Plaintiffs cannot sustain their burden of proving that the
purported defect in the furnace occurred before the closing, since
their
own
inspector's report tends to prove the opposite and
Plaintiffs lack admissable evidence that the defect did not occur
after the closing, notwithstanding the indefinite hearsay about an
unnamed Mountain Fuel employee days after the the Plaintiffs had
exclusive control over the furnace (A jury question);
b.
Plaintiffs waited thirty days to hire an attorney to dun
Defendants for the total cost of a new furnace, because Plaintiffs'
damaged the furnace, their own inspector previously having assured
Plaintiffs of the fitness of the furnace shortly before the sale was
closed;
c.
Plaintiffs
refused to contact Defendants, to permit an
attempt to repair the purported split, and to negotiate a fair
resolution of their differences, but instead waited thirty-five days
and hired an attorney so as to obtain a new furnace to which
Plaintiffs had no contractural right;
d.
there was no mutual assent or meeting of the minds as to a
warranty in the form contract of adhesion drafted by Plaintiff where
Defendant expressed in the "contract" words tending to establish his
intent to withhold a warranty in lieu of requiring Plaintiffs instead
to rely on their inspector, and the lack of assent is always a
question of fact for a jury.
Plaintiffs
claim
Defendants'
"conclusions
of
law"
are
"inappropriately" submitted to this Court, however, in paragraph five
of their reply they contradictorily complain Defendants "fail to
address legal arguments."
2.
Plaintiff
cannot avoid by motion the obligation to sustain
the burden of proving
that the alleged defect existed before the
closing and Plaintiffs' affidavit merely swears inadmissable hearsay
upon hearsay as to what Plaintiff affiant heard some unnamed declarant
say five days after the closing. Plaintiffs' inspector's report is
probative
that the purported defect arose after closing, and that
Plaintiffs
may have caused
the damage
as a pretext
to
coerce
Defendants
into providing
a new furnace, in a fashion simlar to
Plaintiffs' groundless
complaints
about the refrigerator. A jury may
resolve these inferences from the evidence against Plaintiffs.

A O ,i

3.
Plaintiffs'
assertion that the hearsay upon hearsay in
Plaintiffs' affidavit is admissable as a "present sense impression"
demonstrates a woeful misunderstanding of URE 803 (1)• The affiant is
not
the
unnamed declarant of the statements Plaintiff affiant
asserts were uttered days after the event which was the subject of
impressions, the splitting of the furnace chamber. This form of
hearsay is the most unreliable type that litigants attempt to proffer
when competent evidence is non-existent and it is most suspect when
asserted by a self-interested Plaintiff, especially since admission
would deny the Defendant the Constitutional right to confront the
declarant witness and test him under cross-examination as to the
"present sense impression" as said and as to what was actually meant
by declarant . PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS ARE INADMISSABLE UNLESS A
DECLARANT STATES THE HEARSAY CONTEMPORANEOUSLY WITH THE OBSERVATION
OF THE EVENT THAT PROMPTS THE STATEMENT WHILE HE IS PERCEIVING THE
OCCURENCE OF THE EVENT TO WHICH IT RELATES. It is obvious that the
unnamed
declarant DID NOT observe the purported occurence, the
splitting of the furnace chamber. What self-interested Plaintiff
thinks he overheard or perceived the declarant to say AN INDETERMINATE
number
of
days
after the subject event may have occured is
inadmisable and unreliable since the impression is not affiant's
"present sense impression" or anyone else's, but is the putative,
formulated opinion of an unqualified, nameless non-party lacking the
foundation to establish him as an expert prior to proffering his
hearsay. Utah RE 802; URCP 56 (e) and 43 (a) & (b) .
4.
Plaintiff's
affidavit
is replete and reliant upon the
purported personal knowledge of other declarants, not affiant's.
Plaintiff affiant is no furnace expert. In fact, Plaintiffs attack
Defendants in paragraph three of Plaintiff's "Objection to Defendants'
Affidavit" for offering similar out-of-court admissions of Plaintiffs'
agent inspector, even though Plaintiff, not Defendant, bears the
burden of proof.
5.
Plaintiffs lack admissable evidence to conclusively prove
when the purported furnace split and Plaintiffs' inspector's report
about
the
sound
condition
of
the furnace precludes summary
disposition. Plaintiffs proffer only inadmissable and inconclusive
circumstantial hearsay of a nameless declarant allegedly said after
the
Plaintiffs had sole possession and purportedly recalled in
Plaintiffs', not declarant's, affidavit. Another material question of
fact precluding summary disposition is that Plaintiffs may have
damaged the furnace and refused to permit a repair to wrongfully
obtain a new furnace. Admittedly, Plaintiff did not file a wastefully
expensive and unnecessary formal brief of the law, it being obvious in
this $1,300.00 furnace case that Plaintiffs lack the factual proof to
make their case on motion or before a jury. Plaintiffs continue to
demand that to which they are not entitled, the total cost of a new
furnace, challenging Defendants to sustain the unnecessary spiraling
expenses Plaintiffs' brief perpetuates, notwithstanding that it is
abundantly clear that unresolved, pivotal factual questions preclude
summary judgment.

09J

6.
Plaintiffs1
erroneously fault Defendants for Plaintiff's
costly rush to an attorney before contacting Defendants about the
furnace and then to the courthouse to intimidate the unrepresented
Defendants upon their notification to Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs'
inspector reported that he had not found a defect in the furnace
before the closing. Plaintiffs refused to respond to this notification
during negotiations and sued. It was Plaintiffs' who wastefully filed
this $2,200.00 Motion for Summary judgment fully realizing they have
no real proof for the jury of when the defect occurred, nor that
Plaintiffs
did
not
damage the furnace themselves. Plaintiffs'
affidavit merely underscores their intractable demand for the entire
cost of a new furnace and Plaintiffs' needless and exorbitant attorney
fees. Plaintiffs' "readily offer" evidence of attorney fees to the
Court when challenged, but still actually withhold it as they avoid
submitting the "best evidence" of the price paid for the new furnace,
a paid invoice. No attorney would expect a client to pay upon a
statement as vague as Plaintiffs submitted.
Plaintiffs refused to negotiate a reasonable resolution like the
provision of the value of a serviceable furnace of the same type and
age
as
the existing furnace, with Plaintiffs contributing the
additional amount toward the cost of the new furnace. However,
Plaintiff's still unconscionably demand as a windfall not only the
whole cost be sustained by Defendants who never intended a warranty,
but also Plaintiffs' attorneys fees be paid for the attempt to foist
on Defendants the onerous demand that is well beyond the fair amount
of damages that would be recoverable if there had been mutual assent
to a warranty.

DATE: 10 January 1992
FRANKLIN RICHARD /BRUSSOW, # 5 4 2 9
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE
HONRUD
HONRUD,

and

STEPHANIE

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiffs,

OF

v.

DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

Civil No. 910904831CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Patricia L. LaTulippe, being first duly sworn upon oath,
states:
1.

I am an attorney in good standing licensed to practice

law in the State of Utah, and have acted as counsel for the
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled matter.
2.

Nielsen & Senior has spent approximately 47.1 hours

bring this claim to judgment; Neil R. Sabin has billed 1.6 hours

14888

- 1-

at $130 an hour, I have billed 45.5 hours at $75 an hour, for a
total

of

$3,620.50.

This

includes

investigation,

extensive

settlement efforts, and the drafting of various pleadings.

The

time involved, as per agreement with the client, is reasonable
and comparable with others providing similar services.
3.

The costs incurred for this matter are $135.09.

DATED this //^day of December, 1991.

PATRICIALTLATDISPPE

On the

/H^i

day of December, 1991, personally appeared

before me PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE, the signer of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the
same.
fanef**

I /fT-'^

'S^^tx^se^s^Tje^Ssf'-^ef^il

LAl-JXC- KAY S=fKl\S 1
STATOFbTAH
5>*
"**

14888

NOTARY PUBLIC
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Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
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-^?-

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD
HONRUD,

and

STEPHANIE

STATEMENT OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil No. 910904831CV

DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Judge Anne M. Stirba
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to court order, submit the following
detailed breakdown of attorney fees and costs incurred in the
above-named case:
DATE

ATTORNEY

5/16/91

LaTulippe

5/17/91

LaTulippe

5/22/91

LaTulippe

HOURS

DESCRIPTION

1.00 Initial meeting with the
Honruds to discuss matter;
Drafting demand letters
to seller and inspection
company.
0.30 Finalization of demand
letters; verification
with client of accuracy.
0.10 Follow-up with Stephanie
re: mailing of letter.

AMOUNT
75.00

22.50

7.50

I - —

5/28/91

LaTulippe

5/31/91

LaTulippe

6/03/91

LaTulippe

6/04/91

LaTulippe

6/10/91

LaTulippe

6/12/91

LaTulippe

6/13/91

LaTulippe

6/17/91 LaTulippe

6/18/91

LaTulippe

6/21/91

LaTulippe

7/01/91

LaTulippe

7/03/91

LaTulippe

7/08/91

LaTulippe

0.40 Cover letter explaining
retainer. Call with
Stephanie.
0.20 Telephone conferences
with Curtis McDouglass,
the Kerseys and clients
(concerning the issues
of the case).
0.10 Telephone conference
with Stephanie as to
Kersey's response.
1.90 Conference with Faust;
investigation of reply
letter; drafting answer
to reply; finalize
second draft with
letter to Honruds;
0.40 Call with Stephanie to
discuss response and
follow-up.
0.50 Letter to Kersey's to
supplement requested
information. Conference
with Mark Anderson on
contractual matters.
0.40 Discussion with Faust
regarding steps to
follow; telephone
conference with Honruds.
0.40 Investigating Trust Deed
to determine if transaction
resulted in merger of title
which would affect this
case. Follow-up call to
Dave Honrud.
0.40 Follow-up and further
investigation of
warranties.
0.50 Drafting letter to Kerseys
responding to their questions
and reaffirming our position.
0.30 Calls with Stephanie on
lack of response and next
step.
0.10 Call with Stephanie
discussing filing a
complaint and retainer.
0.70 Call with Mr. Dave Honrud
on case status. Drafting
reply to Kerseys.

30.00
15.00

7.50
142.50

30.00
37.50

30.00

30.00

30.00
37.50
22.50
7.50
52.50

15920.2
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7/17/91

LaTulippe

7/23/91

LaTulippe

7/25/91

LaTulippe

7/25/91

Sabin

7/29/91

Sabin

7/29/91

LaTulippe

8/06/91

LaTulippe

8/13/91

LaTulippe

8/28/91

LaTulippe

9/03/91

LaTulippe

9/04/91

LaTulippe

9/05/91

LaTulippe

9/09/91 LaTulippe
9/11/91

LaTulippe

9/12/91

LaTulippe

9/13/91

LaTulippe

0.30 Follow-up call with
Stephanie upon receipt of
Kersey's letter;
conference with Neil
Sabin.
1.50 Call with Stephanie to
discuss case procedures,
time frame, judgment;
drafting complaint.
0.70 Second draft complaint
adding breach of contract
claim.
0.20 Review proposed complaint
for form and
completeness.
0.20 Review of amended
complaint.
0.30 Finalizing Complaint.
0.10 Follow-up on service of
complaint.
0.30 Follow-up on service of
complaint.
0.40 Settlement discussion with
opposing counsel on resolving
dispute.
0.80 Call with Ms. Honrud to
discuss settlement and
inspection. Review answer
from Kerseys.
0.30 Call with Mr. Brussow to
set up inspection meeting;
call to Honruds to get
approval as to time for
inspection.
0.60 Follow-up on arranging
inspection; calls to Mr.
Brussow and the Honruds.
0.20 Reminder letter for
inspection meeting.
0.10 Further follow-up on
scheduling.
1.50 Meeting with clients,
opposing counsel,
Mountain Fuel, TCI, and
furnace repairman;
Conference with Mountain
Fuel and clients afterwards.
0.50 Telephone conference with
Mr. Brussow to discuss
settlement possibilities.

22

112

52
26
26
22
7
22
30
60

22

45
15
7
112

37

15920.3
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9/16/91

LaTulippe

9/19/91 LaTulippe

9/20/91

LaTulippe

9/24/91

LaTulippe

9/27/91

LaTulippe

9/30/91

LaTulippe

10/02/91

LaTulippe

10/07/91

LaTulippe

10/08/91

LaTulippe

10/11/91

LaTulippe

10/16/91

LaTulippe

10/17/91

LaTulippe

10/23/91

LaTulippe

15920.4

0.50 Telephone conference with
Honruds on settlement
proposal; call back from
Mrs. Honrud; conference
with Neil Sabin.
0.30 Telephone conference
discussing settlement with
Mr. Brussow; telephone
conference with Honruds
discussing settlement.
0.40 Follow-up call with
Stephanie on settlement
status.
0.60 Telephone conference with
Mr. Brussow; review of
Kersey offer; call to Mr.
Honrud to discuss offer;
reply letter to Kerseys.
0.20 Telephone conference with
Stephanie on status of
settlement.
0.20 Phone call with Stephanie
to get BTU information on
furnace.
0.60 Review of settlement offer
and letter to Honruds.
Telephone conference with
Stephanie.
0.10 Telephone conference re:
furnace and go ahead to
install.
2.00 Drafting motion and
memorandum to support
summary judgment.
0.20 Reading through letter
from Mr. Brussow;
response to his office.
0.30 Telephone conference with
Stephanie Honrud on status
of case.
2.60 Telephone conference with
Mr. Honrud; letter to Mr.
Brussow rejecting offer;
further drafting of
memorandum for summary
judgment.
0.30 Follow-up with Mountain
Fuel; review Mr,
Brussow's letter and our
response.

37.50

22,50

30.00
45.00

15.00
15.00
45.00

7.50
150.00
15.00
22.50
195.00

22.50

10/23/91
10/24/91

Sabin
LaTulippe

10/25/91

LaTulippe

10/28/91

LaTulippe

10/30/91

LaTulippe

10/31/91

LaTulippe

11/04/91

LaTulippe

11/07/91

LaTulippe

11/08/91

LaTulippe

11/15/91

LaTulippe

11/18/91

LaTulippe

12/04/91

LaTulippe

12/05/91
12/06/91

LaTulippe
LaTulippe

12/09/91

LaTulippe

12/10/91

Sabin

12/10/91

LaTulippe

12/11/91

LaTulippe

0.20 Reply letter to Brussow.
0.50 Further follow-up with
Mountain Fuel; discussing
possibility of an affidavit;
conference with Neil Sabin.
0.30 Letter to Honruds
concerning payment.
0.40 Telephone conference with
Mr. Croft, legal counsel
for Mountain Fuel, to
discuss affidavit.
1.00 Drafting Dave and
Stephanie Honrud's
affidavit; further
drafting of memorandum
for summary judgment.
0.40 Review Kersey offer and
letter to client.
0.20 Telephone conference
with Stephanie Honrud on
settlement.
1.00 Further drafting of
Honrud affidavit.
1.20 Telephone conference with
Stephanie; drafting
motion and memorandum for
Summary Judgment.
1.50 Research on abrogation
clauses.
2.00 Further research in
preparation for summary
judgment.
1.50 Further research and
investigation.
.60 Further drafting of memo.
2.00 Further drafting of
memorandum.
1.50 Research on contract
language and further
drafting of memo.
0.50 Review Memorandum and
Motion for Summary
Judgment.
1.70 Second draft of memo.
Drafting affidavit of
Patricia LaTulippe.
3.00 Third draft. Finalize
Motion, memo and
affidavits.

26.00
37.50

22.50
30.00

75.00

30.00
15.00
75.00
90.00

112.50
150.00
112.50
45.00
150.00
112.50
65.00
127.50
225.00

15920.5
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12/27/91

LaTulippe

12/30/91

LaTulippe

12/30/91

Sabin

12/31/91

LaTulippe

1/21/92

LaTulippe

2/21/92
2/28/92

LaTulippe
LaTulippe

3/02/92

LaTulippe

3/03/92

LaTulippe

3/04/92
3/11/92

LaTulippe
Sabin

1.40 Review of documents;
conference with Neil R.
Sabin; further review and
preparation for response.
2.00 Drafting objection to
Defendant's affidavit;
reply to Defendant's
response and a request
for ruling.
0.30 Review Reply Memo for
Summary Judgment and
drafting objection to
Affidavit.
1.40 Second draft and
finalization of reply
pleadings.
0.20 Follow-up with Stephanie
on status of Summary
Judgment.
0.10 Follow-up on hearing.
1.00 Review pleadings in
preparation for hearing
on Summary Judgment.
3.00 Preparation for oral
argument on Plaintiffs'
Summary Judgment Motion;
appearance at Summary
Judgment Hearing.
0.60 Drafting order for
summary judgment.
Revisions
to judge's order.
0.30
Review
Summary
Judgment
0.30
Order for form and substance.

Total fees for Services This Period

5/28/91
5/28/91
6/21/91
7/08/91
7/10/91
7/30/91
7/30/91
7/31/91

Copy Charges
Copy Charges
Copy Charges
Copy Charges
Postal Charges
Filing fee for complaint
Messenger Delivery
Postal Charges

15920.6

105.00

150.00

39.00

105.00
15.00
7.50
75.00
225.00

45.00
22.50
39.00

4,151.00

0.60
0.20
0.80
0.40
0.29
75.00
5.00
0.52

8/20/91 Constable's fee for service of summons and
complaint upon defendants Kersey
8/20/91 Copy Charges
8/20/91 Messenger Delivery
8/24/91 Copy Charges
10/23/91 Copy Charges
10/25/91 Copy Charges
10/25/91 Postal Charges
11/08/91 Copy Charges
12/05/91 Westlaw Charges
12/11/91 Postal Charges
12/11/91 Westlaw Charges
12/11/91 Copy Charges
12/11/91 Copy Charges
12/11/91 Messenger Delivery
12/30/91 Postal Charges
12/31/91 Copy Charges
1/02/92 Copy Charges
1/02/92 Postal Charges
3/02/92 Copy Charges
3/05/92 Postal Charges
3/12/92 Messenger Delivery
3/12/92 Copy Charges
Total Advanced Costs

\6&- day

of April, 1992.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Patricia L. LaTulippe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

15920.7

0 80
5 00
1. 80
3 00
0 80
0 58
5, 60
13.00
1, 90
7, 50
1. 60
25.20
5.00
0.52
4.80
5.20
2.90
3.20
0.52
5.00
1.20
213.43

Total Fees and Costs
DATED this

35.50

4,364.43

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

{(J— day of April, 1992, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Statement of
Attorneys' Fees and Costs to be placed in the United States mail,
first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COl^TYoOFoS^^ L^KE
•"."JT

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

BY

RESPONSE TO MOTION
OBJECTION
Case No. C 91 - 4831
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065
DEFENDANTS* RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
FEES AND COSTS
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
DEFENDANTS HEREBY DEMAND A HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION
PREVIOUSLY ASSERTED THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.

HAVING

DEFENDANTS SAY:
1.
The contract between the parties, clause Nf provides a
reasonable attorney's fee, costs and expenses may only be granted when
such amounts arise or accrue from enforcing or pursuing a remedy.
2.
The charges in Plaintiffs' Statement
unwarranted throughout, more specifically:

are unreasonable and

the
entries
from
3/11/92
- 3/11/92 unreasonably
demand one hour and twenty four minutes or $116.50 for
a
simple
two
page
order that could have been
dictated, typed and edited in less than .50 hours;
the entry of 3/02/92 unreasonably demands three hours or
$ 225.00 to attend and argue a half-hour motion that
Plaintiffs' counsel previously researched and prepared
the entries of 10/23/92, 10/24/92, 10/28/92 wherein
Plaintiffs
unsuccessfully
attempted
to
obtain an
affidavit from a Mt. Fuel employee that was refused due
to the incompetence of that proposed affiant to swear
to the defect Plaintiffs allege occurred after the
closing are unreasonable.
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3.
If the Mt. Fuel employee's testimony could have factually
established that a defect occurred before the closing to support the
Plaintiffs* motion by arguably effectuating the warranty, they could
have subpoenaed and deposed that witness over his refusal of an
affidavit. However, the facts being other than they wished, Plaintiffs
offered their own inadmissable and prohibited hearsay affidavit that
ascribed statements to a Mt. Fuel employee who refused to so swear.
The "warrantyf" clause C, terminated by its own terms at closing. Fees
for services on 10/23/92, 10/24/92, 10/28/92 are unreasonable and
non-assessable. URCP 56(e), 43(a), 43(b), and RE 802.
4.
It is unreasonable to penalize Defendants for fees associated
with services related to Plaintiffs' inability to secure a reliable
and admissable affidavit containing an expert opinion to prove their
case, especially when such refusal by Mt. Fuel cogently demonstrated
to Plaintiffs that proof as to when the purported defect occurred was
non-existent.
5.
Nor
should
Defendants
be
penalized for the cost of
Plaintiff's
own
affidavit on 10/30/91, 11/7/91, 12/10/91, that
inadmissably
attempted
to
attribute to the Mt. Fuel employee
unreliable, self-serving hearsay of what Plaintiffs said they heard
the declarant say in their attempt to overcome the truth. It is
unreasonable to charge services associated with the creation and
submission of the unlawful affidavit against Defendants.
6.
Attorney's
fees,
costs
and expenses were unreasonably
generated in this de minimus case since Plaintiff s unreasonably
incurred attorneys fees before giving notice to Defendants of the
purported
breach,
refused to permit Defendants to cure before
escalating expenses by involving attorneys, hastily instituted suit
while negoitiations were ongoing, refused offers of judgment made in
an amount commensurate with the benefit of the bargain allegedly lost,
and demanded an unreasonable remedy contrary to hornbook contract law:
to wit, damages in the amount of a new furnace well in excess of the
bargain allegedly lost - the value of a used furnace in the used
dwelling that Plaintiffs purchased.
7.
Defendants never warranted that the purchase of the older
dwelling included a new furnace in the bargain and it was unreasonable
for
Plaintiffs to demand as remedy that for which they never
bargained, a new furnace, while needlessly increasing attorney fees to
obtain a windfall to which Plaintiffs were not entitled.
8.
Although Defendants appeared gratuitously at the house after
the closing to assist Plaintiffs in learning how to operate the
various features of the dwelling and Defendants had received notice
of, and solved, other of Plaintiffs' complaints, the Plaintiffs
unreasonably incurred attorney fee's before notifying Plaintiffs
thirty-five days after the closing about the furnace defect that
purportedly occurred before the closing. Such fees are unreasonable.

12 0

9.
Defendants
demonstrated reasonable conduct throughout to
negotiate the resolution of this matter after being informed of the
defect alleged, but Plaintiffs unreasonably chose to incur attorney
fees before reasonably giving Defendants notice. Plaintiffs then
demanded
the unnecessary attorney's fees they caused themselves
through unreasonable haste, immediately obviating fair settlement.
10. Then Plaintiffs unreasonably chose to increase their expenses
by onerously filing suit on 29 July 1991 against the unrepresented
Plaintiffs in response to Defendants1 report to Plaintiffs1 counsel
that the furnace inspector hired by Plaintiffs agreed that the furnace
was in good operating condition shortly before the closing. Plaintiffs
unreasonably terminated the negotiations and sued to punish Defendants
for reasonably seeking an explanation as to why Plaintiffs1 untimely
notice of defect was contradicted by Plaintiffs1 own expert.
11. Plaintiffs refused to accept as a reasonable resolution, the
provision of the value of a serviceable furnace of the same type and
age
as
the existing furnace, with Plaintiffs contributing the
additional amount toward the cost of the new furnace.
TO
CORROBORATE THE CONTENT OF THE PARAGRAGHS ABOVE, DEFENDANTS
INCORPORATE BY REFERENCE IS IF FULLY SET FORTH HEREIN DEFENDANTS'
AFFIDAVIT AND THE EXHIBITS APPENDED THERETO AS PREVIOUSLY FILED IN
THIS COURT.
DATE: 8 May 1992
FRANKLIN RICHARD/feRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was served on
Plaintiffs' Counsel at her business address noticed in this case by
First Class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid/?on 8 May 1992.
DATE: 8 May 1992

^^^f^^V^^
FRANKLIN RICHARJ^BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
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STATE OF UTAH
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT

W ^ a. 1992
—

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE HONRUD,

SA'UA»» COUNTY

By.

RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs,
v
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY,

Case No. C 91 - 4831

Defendants.

JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
DEFENDANTS SAY:
1.
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for attorney fees on 30 April
1992 and Defendants filed their Objection to this Motion on 8 May
1992.
2.
Defendants
objected
to
specific
fees associated with
particular services as is permitted by law. Objection, Paragraph 2.
3.
Defendants also objected to the unreasonable amount of the
fees generated by Plaintiffs' Counsel since the contract the Court
determined to be enforceable grants fees only for those services
reasonably necessary to enforce the conditions of the contract. Clause
N.
Documents in the Court file and submitted exhibits established
that
Defendants always reasonably sought to resolve Plaintiffs'
dispute without the unnecessary intervention of the Court.
4.
Defendants should not be punished or sanctioned pursuant to
Plaintiffs' Motion for merely asserting their right to have the Court
determine whether attorney fees four times greater than the benefit of
the bargain allegedly demanded BY Plaintiffs are unreasonable and did
not have to be unncessarily generated if Plaintiffs had merely
contacted Defendants and attempted to resolve the matter between the
parties rather than incurring the needless expense of hiring counsel
and bringing a suit that put settlement out of reach.
5.
Should the Court be of a mind to penalize Defendants for
requesting their objections be heard, Defendants would waive the right
to a hearing and would acquiesce in the Court deciding the issue of
fees on the written record to avoid further exposure to sanctions.
WHEREFORE,
Sanctions.

Defendants

request

the

Court deny Plaintiffs* Motion for

1°J

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiffs'
assert
Defendants are in bad faith and should be
sanctioned because they request that Court determine what attorney
fees, if any, are "reasonable" in this case. In determining what is
a "reasonable" attorney's fee, a valid and unresolved factual and
legal determination, the Court may be guided by analogy to those
provisions of 42 USC 1983 and 1988 concerning "reasonable attorney
fees" that have long been interpreted by the Federal Courts from which
Utah derives a substantial portion of the URCP and URE.
Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, 488 F2d 714 (CAS 1974) is the
seminal holding often cited as establishing those factors to be
considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fee. The eighth
factor in Johnson is most significant in this case - 8. the amount
involved and the results obtained.
Plaintiffs erroneously claim Defendants are in bad faith, since they
object to a $4,000.00 fee in a case that allegedly involved only
$1,100.00 for a new furnace. This is unreasonable and objection is
clearly warranted under existing principles of law, Johnson, which
establishes Defendant's good faith, if not absolute, right to object
to the excessive fee to produce a modest recovery.
Johnson relevantly teaches that the result obtained in Plaintiffs'
attempt to secure an affidavit from Mt. Fuel should not be assessed
against Defendants since the services obtained no result. Defendants
are in good faith when protesting those fees, since such efforts of
Plaintiff's counsel did nothing to further the achievement of a
successful result. Johnson warrants this objection is well grounded in
the facts sworn to in the record as filed. Attempting to punish
Defendants under Rule 11 for their reliance on the principles of law
established in Johnson, and a myriad of cases that analogize to that
holding, is frivolous and unsupported by Rule 11.
In this case the court is offered only the applicant's self-serving
affidavit that counsel thinks her fees are reasonable. Normally an
applicant must obtain the affidavit of another dis-interested attorney
in the area and submit same to the court or cite to previous awards by
other courts. In ten years of practice before the Federal bench during
which Defendants' counsel filed for and was awarded attorney fees for
prevailing, never did a court rule that an objection and demand for a
hearing on a fee statement was unwarranted by law. It is counsel's
burden to establish the services billed were "reasonable." Due process
requires it and objecting to Plaintiffs' motion is not bad faith or
harassment - it is Defendants' right. It is not harassment to object
to that which the law provides is improper or unjust, especially when
established legal principles provide logical and legal basis for such
objections.
Addressing
the
other
Johnson
factors
which demonstrate that
Defendants' objections are in good faith, are valid and are not in any
manner harassment or violative of Rule 11 and 78-27-56:
1.
time and labor required - Defendants' objection establishes
that some services of Plaintiffs' counsel were not only unnecessary to
prevail,
but
also
needlessly contributed nothing but expense;

]?3

2.
the novelty and difficulty of the questions - This case was
not a complex litigation;
3.
the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly Only average skills would be required in a case of this type;
4.
preclusion of other employment - Counsel would be precluded
from addressing other cases while working on this case;
5.
customary fee - Plainbtiffs' Counsel's affidavit is devoid as
to her customary fee;
6.
whether the fee is fixed or contingent - No indication of the
terms of the contract between Counsel and Plaintiffs are revealed, nor
is the contract for services rendered submitted to the Court for
review, in camera or otherwise;
7.
time limitations - Time was not a factor enhancing the rate
charged.
Johnson
is especially relevant since Defendants offered half the
price of a new furnace to replace the used furnace for which
Plaintiffs
bargained,
and
Plaintiffs'
attorney
fees
were
self-inflicted by their premature rush to incur the expense of an
attorney rather than first giving notice of the alleged defect to
obtain repair or replacement, and also by impatiently filing suit
against the unrepresented Defendants while negotiations were ongoing.
The contract, Clause N, provides for "reasonable,"
not actual,
attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs'
delaying
thirty days without giving any notice to
Defendants and rushing off to an attorney, then to the courthouse
while negotiations were ongoing bespeaks Plaintiff's unreasonableness
from the onset. The Court may analogize to legal principles extending
refusal to award attorney fees that are statutorily provided for under
the Federal Freedom of Information Act to those contractually included
in Clause N in this case. Where
litigants like Plaintiffs refuse to
first test the possibilities of a potentially far less expensive and
no less effacacious method of dispute resolution, like notifying
Defendants
of Plaintiffs' demand before incurring and demanding
needless attorney fees, and then exacerbate delay and contribute to a
probably unnecessary lawsuit by filing suit, attorney's fees should be
denied. Murty v OPM, 707 F2d 815, 816 (CA4 1983).
Likewise, when parties to a dispute are making progress toward
negotiating a settlement although confronted with the prospect of
exposure to attorney fees, Courts have refused to grant attorney fees
to a party who refuses to direct a minimal response like a phone call
to the Defendant to ascertain the accuracy of Plaintiff's perception
that
Defendant
is
no longer negotiating toward a resolution,
preferring instead to unreasonably file suit because of a loss of
patience. Vermont Low Income v Usery, 546 F2d 509, 513-514 (CA2 1976):
But, as every lawyer should know, the fact that a party is
legally entitled to invoke the aid of the courts does not
demonstrate that a rush to the courthouse door is always
reasonable.
Pursuant
to Rule 11, there are existing legal principles that
logically warrant extension to the facts of the instant case wherein
Defendants request that the court determine Plaintiff's demand for
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attorney's fees is both excessive and unreasonable pursuant to the law
and the relevant facts. The unreasonable and excessive attorney fees
of Plaintiffs should be denied to avoid reinforcing litigatious
parties
who unreasonably rush to the courthouse to sue first,
contentiously
incurring
and
demanding
attorney fees that put
settlement out of reach, and then ask questions later.
DATE: 28 May 1992
FRANKLIN RICHARD BKUSSOW, #
Attorney for Defendants
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
801 - 944 - 1065
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the above document was served on
Plaintiffs1 Counsel at her business address noticed in this case by
First Class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paijjK, on 28 May
DATE: 28 May 1992
FRANKLIN RICHARD E^ftUSSOW, # 5429
Attorney for Defendants
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Neil R. Sabin (2840)
Patricia L. LaTulippe (5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza & Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900

,-J*

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DALE KERSEY AND BARBARA KERSEY,
Defendants.

) REPLY TO DEFENDANTS'
) RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 910904831CV
Judge Anne M. Stirba

The Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, submit a brief
reply to the Defendants' Response to Motion for Sanctions.
Defendants fail to recognize Plaintiffs• point in filing the
Motion for Sanctions,

Plaintiffs are not questioning Defendants'

rights to object or question the reasonableness of Plaintiffs'
fees.

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Defendants have a right to

review and question fees incurred by Plaintiffs.

The purpose

behind Plaintiffs' Request for Sanctions has nothing to do with
the attorneys fees.

Rather, the Request for Sanctions is based

upon the fact that Defendants continue to reargue issues
16636

1?3

previously decided by this Court.
the question of attorneys fees.

These issues are extraneous to

Thus, Defendants1 actions,

consistent with past problems encountered by Plaintiffs, continue
to increase Plaintiffs' losses. For these reasons, Plaintiffs
move the Court for sanctions.
DATED this ^^i^-day of June, 1992.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Nell R. SafedTn
Patricia L. LaTulippe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS, was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, on the ^>^-day of June, 1992, addressed
as follows:
Franklin R. Brussow, Esq.
P. 0. 21705
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121

/Z^^^)^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
5

DAVE HONRUD and STEPHANIE
HONRUD

6

Plaintiff,

Transcript of:

7
8
9

Motion for
Summary Judgment

vs.
DALE KERSEY and BARBARA KERSEY

10

Case No. 910904831

Defendant.

11
12

The

above-entitled

cause

of

action

came

on

13

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba,

14

a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State

15

of Utah; at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Monday, March 2,

16

1992, at 2:00 p.m.

17

APPEARANCES

18
19

For the Plaintiff:

PATRICIA L. LATULIPPE
Attorney at Law
60th East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSS0W
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 21705
Salt Lake City, Utah

20
21
22
23
24
25

1

MONDAY. MARCH 2. 1992

2

2:00 P.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

Let's go on the

4

record in the matter of Honrud vs. Kersey, case No.

5

910904831.

6

the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

7

would you state your appearances, please.

8

The matter comes before the Court pursuant to

VOICE:

9

Counsel,

Patricia Latulippe appearing on behalf

of the plaintiffs.

10

VOICE:

11

behalf of the defendants.

12

I am Franklin Brussow.

THE COURT: All right.

I am here on

Thank you, counsel. I

13

have reviewed all of the proceedings pertaining to this

14

Motion for Summary Judgment, including this affidavit and

15

there actually were two pleadings by each party.

16 I

was actually a response by the defendant to the reply of

17

the plaintiff, and I feel very well informed as to the

18

facts of the case and so you don't need to go into detail

19

about those.

20

You may proceed Ms. Latulippe.

MS. LATULIPPE:

21

There

Your Honor, this is a very

simple case and we are sorry to be before you taking your
I

i

»

22 I

time.

23

for breach of warranty and for the cost and expenses that

24

have resulted from that warranty.

25

As you have read the pleadings, it is an action

The parties entered into a contract, an Earnest

1

Money Contract to purchase property.

2

possession of the property, the furnace was not in the

3

condition that it was represented to be.

4

closing, at the time they took possession, they had a

5

Mountain Fuel representative come out.

6

first attempt to use the furnace.

7

representative told them that the furnace was unsafe.

8

fact, life-threatening, that he would not light the

9

furnace until it was replaced or repaired.

10
11

When they took

Four days after

This was the

At this time the
In

At that point

they contacted me.
They are first-time buyers, a young couple, and

12

they did not know how to proceed.

13

sent a letter to defendant advising them of the problem

14

and asking that they contact us so that we might discuss

15

a resolution.

16

believe there are some of those that have been submitted

17

to the Court.

18

we would be happy to offer to allow an inspection of the

19

property with a 24-hour notice.

20

notice, and an inspection was never scheduled.

21

advised the defendants that if an inspection was not

22

scheduled, we would go ahead and file a complaint, and we

23

did not hear, that inspection was not scheduled nor

24

attempted to be and so we did file a complaint.

25

They contacted me. We

A series of letters were exchanged and I

And we repeatedly told the defendants that

With just a 24-hour
We

Subsequent to that, there was an inspection

1

that took place of the property in September of 1991,

2

Those present at the inspection were a Mountain Fuel

3

representative, the plaintiffs and I was there, defendant

4

and counsel, his counsel, two independent representatives

5

and the people who had originally inspected the furnace.

6

And they all verified, all those in attendance verified

7

that in fact there was a split in the furnace.

8
9

Before you today there is evidence from the
plaintiff, both in the form of the business record from

10

Mountain Fuel that the condition of the furnace was

11

inoperable, and an affidavit from the plaintiff attesting

12

to that fact.

13

the defendant.

14

warranted that, in fact, the furnace would be in working

15

order.

16
17
18

There is no contrary evidence submitted by
Under the contract, the defendants had

THE COURT:

You are referring to paragraph C of

the Earnest Money Agreement?
MS. LATULIPPE:

I am.

In paragraph C they

19

warranted it would be in sound or satisfactory working

20

condition.

21

which I am now referring to.

22

contract, under No. 6, again seller does not limit in any

23

way the warranties under section C.

24

down on that page, in bold print, there is a provision —

25

well, No. 11 incorporates the general provisions and

In Exhibit 8 is the Earnest Money Contract
On the third page of that

And a little further

t

1

expresses that both the buyer and the seller have

2 I

accepted those.

3 I

express warranties of section C are preserved through the

4

final closing documents.

And on the fourth page, under 0, the

5

Thus it is in clear and unequivocal language,

6

the defendants have warranted that the furnace would be

7

in satisfactory condition.

8

have cited in my memo, is instructive and almost directly

9

on point.

10

And the Brooks case, which I

In Brooks the parties had entered into a

11

contract that contained express warranties.

There was an

12

inspection by professionals before the closing of the

13

contracts.

14

possession of the property, they noticed a strong odor

15

coming 'from the residence.

16

had breached an express warranty and, in fact, the Court

17

found that they had breached an express warranty.

18

this decision was upheld on appeal.

19

Our case is very similar.

After the closing when the buyers took

They alleged that the sellers

And

We have express

20

warranties and the property was in a different condition

21

as promised when the plaintiffs took possession of that

22

property.

23

to refute that.

24
25

There has been no contrary evidence submitted

Furthermore, the provisions that I have
mentioned did not merge at closing.

Utah Courts have

1

held that in a contract when there is a manifest clear

2

intent to preserve rights, that they would not merge.

3

provision 0 we have unambiguous language that preserves

4

those warranties through the final closing.

5

has muddied the issues by submitting numerous, irrelevant

6

facts and frivolous objections and perhaps this gives the

7

Court some idea of the problems we faced in trying to

8

resolve this matter.

9

there is a constitutional right to confront witnesses. I

In

Defendant

Defendant raises an argument that

10

believe counsel is referring to the Sixth Amendment.

11

However, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment

12

does not apply in civil cases, only applies to criminal

13

matters.

14

Defendant argues that the contract was an

15

adhesion contract.

16

forms that was widely accepted throughout the state and

17

used by all realtors.

18

agent drafted the contract or whether the sellers' agent

19

drafted the contract, they both would have used the same

20

forms.

21

The contracts used were the standard

Either agent, whether the buyers'

So it is hardly an adhesion contract.
Defendant objects to plaintiffs' affidavit that

22

it does not identify the declarant.

The Federal Rules of

23

Evidence merely require that the person have personal

24

knowledge, not that they be identified as is the case

25

oftentimes with bystanders.

Also, the business record

1

exception applies. The report from Mountain Fuel

2

establishes the broken condition of the furnace.

3

Instead of responding to the factual issues and

4

to the legal argument, defendant would like to discuss

5

the efforts of settlement.

6

relevant nor admissible.

7

However, these are not

In this case, it is crucial that the plaintiffs

8

be awarded attorney's fees for their rising costs.

9

Again, the pleadings are indicative of why such costs

10

were incurred.

11

be in working condition.

12

go the rounds to try and get a new furnace.

13

Sellers warranted that the furnace would
It was not and we have had to

The contract provides for attorney's fees in

14

provision N and the Utah Courts have held that when fees

15

are provided within a contract, they should be awarded.

16

So in conclusion, the plaintiffs have met their

17

burden of presenting a prima facie case. What evidence

18

is there before the Court to contradict?

19

is, the language of the Court is clear.

The sellers

20

warranted the condition of the furnace.

No evidence has

21

been presented to dispute its condition.

22

made as to the law.

23

Judgment be granted and that the plaintiff's be awarded

24

their attorney's fees.

25

THE COURT:

The bottom line

No response was

We ask that our Motion for Summary

All right.

Thank you,
6

1

Ms. Latulippe.

2

Mr. Brussow.

MR. BRUSSOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

If it

3

please the Court, I am here to un-muddy your water and

4

make things clear, okay, and I hope I can do that.

5

of all, as far as the constitutional right to a jury

6

trial, that is a Fifth Amendment right.

7

people's property away without giving them a hearing, and

8

in this case we would ask for a jury to hear the facts.

9

The question before the Court is:

First

You don't take

M

Are there disputed

10

facts that are reputing any affidavits that would cause

11

this Court to have a .jury hear this case?"

12

are.

And there

13

What counsel is avoiding here is, they had an

14

inspector come and inspect this house pursuant to their

15

rights in the contract shortly before the closing.

That

16

inspector assured them that that furnace was okay.

Five

17

days after the closing, after these people had possession

18

of the house, they found that there was purportedly a

19

crack in the furnace but they waited 30 days in the

20

wintertime to contact the Kerseys, although they

21

contacted the Kerseys about a refrigerator problem that

22

got cured.

23
24
25

THE COURT: What difference does it make how
long they wanted?
MR. BRUSSOW:

Because the fact is that the

1

crack in the furnace had to occur prior to the closing.

2

And if, in fact, there was a difficulty, there were toxic

3

fumes, as they say, as counsel says, and there has been

4

some language thrown around here that muddies the waters,

5

they all verified the split in the furnace.

6

verification from any person about the split in the

7

furnace, other than the plaintiffs themselves.

8

no verification that that split did not occur between the

9

date of the closing and five days later when they took

There is no

There is

10

possession.

11

decide that based upon the way these people conducted

12

themselves, that they waited 30 days after they said the

13

furnace was broken, that they didn't go into the house or

14

did go in the house and didn't ask Mr. Kersey about the

15

furnace/

16

if they called him up about the other items, why did they

17

wait 30 days in the winter to call him up about a

18

furnace?

19

why somebody who had discourse with someone wouldn't

20

complain about a defect.

21

There is no proof here and a Jury could

If they called him up about the refrigerator,

There is a problem here.

THE COURT:

I don't understand

Now, as to this verification, I

22

assume you are making reference to this meeting that

23

occurred at the house for the inspection in the fall.

24

MR. BRUSSOW:

25

THE COURT:

That is correct.
And at that time, according to the
8

1

plaintiff, everybody saw this crack?

2

MR. BRUSSOW:

That is correct, but that doesn't

3

solve the problem because when the furnace was turned off

4

on the date of closing, no one can testify that that

5

crack didn't evidence itself between those five days. No

6

one can say that these people themselves didn't damage

7

that furnace.

8

got a right to decide whether, based upon the inspection

9

of their own inspector that said that furnace was okay

That is a question of fact.

A jury has

10

before the closing, and five days after the closing

11

somebody comes in and says, "There is a split in it," but

12

nobody is saying how that split got there. What caused

13

the split.

14
15 J

THE COURT: Well, you can't speculate to that
in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment.

16

MR. BRUSSOW:

17

THE COURT: What facts do you have before the

18

Exactly.

Court today in opposition to that?

19

MR. BRUSSOW:

I don't need to, the burden is on

20

them and they have never established when that crack

21

occurred.

22

closing there was a crack there, but it is their

23

obligation and their burden of proof to prove that that

24

crack was in that furnace prior to the closing.

25

their own inspector said it wasn't.

They established that five days after the

And

So that, I think, is

1

indicative of a jury question where the jury could say,

2

"Look, their own inspector said there was no crack five

3

days after the closing.'1

4

says the crack was to be in there before the closing.

5

This family lived in there.

6

child.

7

are talking about muddying the water, where is there

8

written proof, where is there any statement about any

9

toxic fumes from any expert, or even this Mountain Fuel

But the contract apparently

They lived in there with a

They didn't die of toxic fumes. And, in fact, we

10

guy.

The plaintiff says that the Mountain Fuel fellow,

11

five days later, said that there were toxic fumes. Does

12

the Court see any proof of that or is that .just the

13

hearsay statement of a plaintiff that is self-serving?

14

Now when we talk about —

15

THE COURT: Well, let's look at that for .just a

16

moment.

17

you have objected to certain portions of that.

18

no Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit before the

19

Court.

20

me that they had some basis for some personal knowledge

21

and can testify as to what they experienced in this case.

22

I didn't see anything objectionable about the affidavit

23

that they submitted.

24
25

There is an affidavit of the plaintiffs.

I know

There is

As I look at the affidavit, though, it appears to

As to that copy of the Mountain Fuel statement,
I think they can testify as to what they received.
10

MR. BRUSSOW:

Who is "they," Your Honor?

THE COURT:

The plaintiffs.

MR. BRUSSOW:

Thank you. Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So I didn't see anything.

It seems

to me that in summary judgment when you are looking at
affidavits, obviously there has to be compliance with the
Rules of Evidence.
MR. BRUSSOW:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.
Nevertheless, I don't think in

summary judgment you have to be unduly technical about
that either and the way I approach that is, see if they
have a basis for personal knowledge.

As I look at all of

their exhibits, and specifically the affidavit, and even
that Mountain Fuel notation, I didn't see anything
technically objectionable about it.
MR. BRUSSOW:

I would like to speak to that

issue. Your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. BRUSSOW:
THE COURT:

I have ruled on that issue.
I didn't know the Court had.
I .just did.

I just indicated to

you that I was aware of your objection and there wasn't a
Motion to Strike as such.

But in light of your

objection, I considered that.
MR. BRUSSOW:
THE COURT:

A Motion to Strike, yes.
No, not a Motion to Strike.

There
11

1 I

wasn't a Motion to Strike, but you objected to certain

2 J

portions of the affidavit and I looked at their affidavit

3

in light of the objections you raised.

4 I

indicated to you my response to that.

5

MR. BRUSSOW:

And I've dust

Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr.

6

Kersey's affidavit does in fact meet that and rebuts that

7

and save, in fact, on the dfly 9f rtln^ma

8 I

split in that furnace.

9

There is no proof anywhere in their affidavit that that

+f|iffre was no

So that is rebutted directly.

10

crack didn't occur after the closing.

11

they have is that five days after the closing, the

12

Honruds discovered a crack in the furnace.

13

THE COURT:

The only proof

Are you saying that if someone

14

doesn't discover a problem, something that has been

15

expressly warranted on the day of closing, that they are

16

barred?

17

MR. BRUSSOW:

No.

I am saying that they have

18

to prove it.

19

They are not barred.

20

crack existed before the closing.

21

They can come in and say, "We found a crack five days

22

later."

23

The burden of proof is on the plaintiff.
They have to come in and prove the
They can't do that.

Now if you turn off a furnace on the day of

24

closing, all right, and it cools down and it cracks three

25 I

days later, what is the difficulty?

We are looking at
12

1

the contract.

2 I

contract too.

3
4

I would like the Court to look at the

THE COURT:

I didn't follow your argument with

regard to that.

5

MR. BRUSSOW:

If the furnace was turned off on

6

the day of the closing and it cooled down, and the crack

7

in the front of the furnace evidenced itself or occurred,

8

all right, on the third day after the closing, they have

9

no right under the contract to contest that because the

10

contract says it has to be operational and functional on

11

the day of the closing.

12 I

this case that it wasn't.

13

And there isn't anv proof in
And that is a jury question.

Also with regard to this contract, it's their

14

mutual assent on a warranty here.

15

questioA.

16

all right, "and there are ambiguities in this contract,

17

then a jury has a right to decide.11

18
19
20

That is a jury

Clause 7 right in the very beginning says (E),

THE COURT:

Only if the contract is ambiguous

on its face.
MR. BRUSSOW:

I would like to speak to that

21

issue. Mr. Kersey's contract here says, "Buyer

22

inspection:

23

property and subject to subsection 1-C above and 6 below,

24

accepts it in its present physical condition, except,"

25

and it says except aqain^. "except as outlined in

buyer has made a visual inspection of the

13

1
2

. paragraph 7."

When, you go to paragraph 7, Mr. Kersey's

contract says, "Special considerations and contingencies:

•3

1

4

conditions and contingencies which must

5

prior to *

6

the I J * *

7

electrical heating system, approval by the buyer of the

M

conditior

y

f i t'Mi'iiiii

closing."

So Mr. Kersey says, "Approval of

: the swimming pool.

11

satisfied

Buyer obtained adequate

-

10

•

•

''

•

So those contingencies had to be satisfied.

11

Those are in lieu of any warranty expressly in the

12

contract and it Is not boiler-plate.

13

The\

14

is, the only exception to that, is they have got to

I

a'ppi ::: e • t h e

16

heating system.

17

there is assent there, there is mutual assent, and they

IB

h In

19

it is okay.

•:• taking it as is except as outlined in 7.

nun I i

20 |

e

i ,

L

and they rely on that and

I in

I'II.K-M

And 7

"The inspector comes in and says that

III > I hf Kerseys don't want any part of the
conl-irai I

n II

i

I In i M

22 I

satisfied,

23

plaintiffs' inspectors.

l!4

okay prior to the closing.

25

It is typed in.

They make the house available to the
He inspects :* and he said

- is

So what we have had to decide here, and what a

jury has to decide, and that is disputed by the
affidavits, is when did the crack occur?

Now, I don't

think there is meeting of the minds on l.li>" assent <>n I In1
warranty here because plainly this contradicts that there
was an assent

are taking the house as

except what
to that is v j hx • .;
yourself.

- to get

inspection to protect

Now they got inspectior

protect themselves.

There was no trickery here

r

inspector said it was okay.
So what is a jury to decide?

Did some time

after their inspection, <»i i i ir i gtrn , ana Buiiie time i M>e .
days after the Mountain Fuel, within that period of time
that furnace had a crack in it. Now

^ think the

Court c&n say when that crack occurred
certainly can't. They don't have

*s

expert that can say

when that thing cracked, but their expert did say shortly
before the closing it wasn't cracked.^
1

"*"

""

So there is a question, of fact for a jury. Your
Honor

A jury has got to make a decision on this case as

to when that crack occurred because even if the Court
believes that there was a mutual assent on the warranty,
and we are objecting to that- $j\ft +h? tiff i^a—lti ip^^tff
that, Mr. Kersey"s affidavit says. "I never intended to
give a warranty."
15

And the reason I mention the 30-day wait of
these plaintiffs is because, you know what, they knew

therf

* NHiiBui

I

w n r r n n t i » bur.^uBe i t t h e y t h o u g h t t h a t

they

were warranted, they would have called them up and asked
them to make good on :i t ;.

Wli/y would they wait 30 days?

They called them about the refrigerator.
days until thgy WAP* *"n
Now

flY1

So they wait 30

^^^^^^

: speak tc

one other issue and I

wrote letters, overtures, to try to reasonably resolve
this matter and he asked them who was the person that
inspected +
himself and find out when this furnace cracked
called the inspector

hearsay.

M

and the inspector said,

Hey, I

It is ixot the present sense impression.

was there and saw that crack.

b\ a t nil . I n , I lii I i MM I In

Nobody

How can you have a

axgunitftit

A IbvBt and<: j i

neew

something and he says something,, that is a present sense
impression.

But if the accident occurred five days

b e t i n i i m l I, mi i 11iniin1

iiiull Il

I!

I I Hi

is not a present sense impression
accident

mrident nee
Yon didn't see

Nobody saw that furnace crack and that is the

p r o b 1 ( i n IIM ni i

Y<":ili

will give you that.

I I n 't i

i

MI i i i\\, k ji i i ill t

When did it happen?

There is no

16

present sense impression that says somebody says, "Yeah,
look at that thing crack."
II i-;1

11

1

iii ni I, I "111.

I"!

H e 11 e n

i?!

i : I II i **

I h<

volcano erupted, and I say "The volcano erupted/* that is
not a present sense impression because I didn't see -~
happei

h.
So the point is this, there isn't any mutual

assent on th* warranty and that has been tested here,
tha b a I n r ",'

. <

(E) on the front page E-l limited that warranty,,
wanted an inspection.
clause

How do we know that?

He only

You look at

Clause 7 says that is your remedy, inspect

this thing.

So there is an ambiguity because now we have

got to go a ] 1 the way back to the boiler-plate.
not typted in.

ClI . .

i in 1 i::i ::: I: i

says now you have got

I t i*.

j ::: • :i t ::: i II gh t it as •

go back to clause 6, which says

you have got to go to clause (C)

I low does a person get

through a contract like this with a limited intelligence,
who is not an attorney?
Now the typed-in portions that I think
supersede

oe Kerseys'

intent to limit that to an inspection in clause (E) on
the front and clause 7 where it. is »t«r. typo^ jn,

The

boiler-plate is where the problem happens.
THE COURT:

Well, didn't the plaintiffs include
17

. «n"t the plaintiffs include that

that provision

provision that they wanted •
o

MR

A

THE COURT:

av-» an inspection?

BRUSSOW:
I

MR. BRUSSOW:
a p p r o v e d I, • ' "

*

look at the contract.
Yes, it says, "Home to be

'

March 5th "

' 'Mint \ n g p i i " i e e I " IIJL« r " m i , ' v e ; l lni

. Kersey is concerned, a

warranty after the closing is a contingency that should
have been removed and that is what he said in that sales
1^

price to be blah-blah-blah, where he dropped the price or
i.'.ame back with a higher price, but he lowered the price,

x

why?

Because he wanted to get out of there clean and he

1

wanted them to inspect it and be happy with it, and that
was the end of it.
Now, we are

Mr. Kersey did

write to them and when he discovered that the T.R.C.
17

person said that that furnace was okay, he wrote a letter

10

back to counsel and he said, "Hey, I tnllw-'ii in vc i ir

19

inspector who said it was okay," and he left it open.

20

They ne ei contacted him again.

2x

sued.

22

to do about it?

23

"They went ahead and

Nobody called him up and said, "What do you want
What do you want to offer?"

If the Court looks in the file, we offered
refused I'haJ

24

pay the price of repair.

25

to pay half the price of the furnace.

We offered

They refused that.
18

THE COURT:

I am not interested in settlement

discussiong ^
BRUSSOW

I

.deraimid,

THE COURT:

That is not properly before the.

If II Il BRUSSOW

But counsel did mention and

Court.

implied that Mr. Kersey wasn't willing to work with them.
He was,

He was.

inspeo t :-( i

He wrote them the letter about the

They never got back to him.

10

response to his letter in the file.

11

lawsuit.
hired * ^

13 I

You won't find

You will find a

So thev went, nh^ffid •—•t^"+-™d n* •hiiir-Sr^ fr0 fr-*™,
ft

*trPrr°y Wfi Y}*™* ™^* v^*^ ^fri*=> —

THE COURT:

But that's all , I hear you.

That

14

really doesn't relate to the i ssue before the Court today

:

a i :i :::! I thi i lk tl: i a t sffor be • t }

16

resolution to this and, you know, your own efforts in

17 I

respecting the lawsuit, certainly I applaud your efforts

::: t:> i mse •]

"i b ::: i xegut I K be -

to try to resolve the matter but I don't think they are
19 I

relevant to summary judgment.

20 I

MR. BRUSSOW:

So basically, Your Honor, when I

<

I'm in i I hh i i ( p e n

""HIPi"t

issues

22

the jury.

23

ambiguity, in this contract whether there was a meeting

1

i iI

25

proof that the jury can decide that these people, the

I In

There is contradictions in this, there's

111 II II 11 II

Ml I

I II

Hi l " l Hi II 11 'i

11 in !

I

I 111 1 I I I ' ,

I I I I . I *i

II

h i i IIII If- 1

19

1

Honruds didn't believe they had a warranty because they

2

didn't call Kersey up right away, like they did with the

3

refrigerator, and say, "Make good or 1 y o\ ir warranty,

I

Kersey

5

there was contact about making good on the furnace.

They went to an attorney and then 30 days later
If

they believed they had a warranty, they would have called
'i I

up like they did on the refrigerator.

That is an

indication, I think, to the .jury that there wasn't a
i nee t::i i: lg • ::: f tl: I s minds oi i a warranty, and the Honruds knew
10

they didn't have a warranty because of clause 7 and

11

because of clause (E)

1

the front.

THE COURT

"! , there i s no evidence in the

13

affidavit to substantiate that conclusion.

14

what yoi i are doing is speculating yourself as to what the

15

parti es;

16

attorney, and that you can conclude —

17

w"I

• plaint:

You know,

. itended by going to an

lot about why they did that.

you can speculate

I mean, there is a b:l g:

IB

difference between a refrigerator not being cool enough

19

in the beginning and, you know, furnace possibly having

20

to be replaced.

21

differences in money, for example.

22

affidavit and the affidavit by the defendants anything

23

that would contradict i lh

24
25

You are maybe talking about a lot of

RUSSOW:
THE COURT:

I don't see in your

Mutual assent?
I

Why the plaintiffs decided to
20

go to an attorney as to that particular problem.
MR. BRUSSOW:
THE COUR'i

That

correct

" reeii

,.

r.
can say that

there is some evidence in dispute as to that. What yoi i
are giving me is argument about, you iF >^i M»*:it »"^ally
speculation, as I see
MR. BRUSSOW:

Right

?here is a concrete

statement in there by Mr. Kersey that he never intended
to give a warranty.

That is directly rebutting their

affidavit.
THE COURT
!IK BRUSSOW:

That is a question for the ,iury.

THE COURT: Well, not necessarily because first
the analysis has

"whether the ::: • ::::)ii tr a c: • t I s a mbi g tic: i is

because'what he intended, that has got to be parol
evidence, and that merges into the contract.

The written

contract is

ies

eviden

intended, and only if :l t is ambiguous do you say there is
a ,iury question there.

But that is the first analysis.

And his blank statemep
only pertinent

-here is an ambiguity in

the contract itself.
MR. BRUSSOW:

And

t

*e feel the ambiguity is, the actual written-in spaces
that limit their right to have it inspected and in lieu
21

1

of the warranty and the clause where we talk about the

2

counter-offer, where they also limited again, that says,

3

'The home is to be approved by the buyer and all

4

contingencies removed."

5

concerned, that means, that language has to be

6

interpreted.

7

mind meant no warranties and there is an ambiguity in

8

this contract, I believe.

9

And as far as Mr. Kersey is

That language Mall contingencies'* in his

And the other issue is basically this:

there

10

is no testimony that that crack was in that furnace prior

11

to the date of closing.

12

that the crack was there five days later.

13

not know —

14

THE COURT:

There is evidence apparently
The Court does

Let's look at that for just a

15

moment because as I understood the affidavit, and you can

16

both speak to this, but their testimony in the affidavit _

17

was that when they attempted to first use the furnace it

18

did not work.

19

MR. BRUSSOW:

That is correct.

The reason it

20

didn't work is because they didn't know how to operate

21

the digital wall light.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BRUSSOW:

There is no evidence as to that.
Right.

But see, the Court is

i

24

concluding that it didfTt wnrV Vieoanse of the crack in

25

it, and I don't think the Court can do that because there^
22

is no statement in the affidavit that said the furnace
wouldn't work because of the crack.
The Mountain Fuel fellow wouldn't light it
because of the crack, but that doesn't mean that the
furnace wouldn't work with that crack in it.
THE COURT: When the Mountain Fuel man went to
turn it on for them, he wouldn't do it.

So the furnace

at least as of the date they first attempted to operate
it, wasn't functioning.
MR. BRUSSOW:

And that date was five days after

the closing.
THE COURT:

All right.

But that is the first

date they tried to use that furnace because they had to
have the Mountain Fuel man come and turn it on for them
because* they had to establish an account with Mountain
Fuel.
MR. BRUSSOW:

They had to light the furnace.

The Mountain Fuel man was there to light the furnace;
that is correct.
THE COURT:
MR. BRUSSOW:
THE COURT:

To turn on the gas.
Right.
In other words, he wasn't there

just to light the furnace.

He was there to turn on the

gas.
MR. BRUSSOW:

Turn on the gas, right.

That is
23

correct.
THE COURT:

So they couldn't have tried to use

the furnace without gas before then.
MR. BRUSSOW:
question becomes:
place?

That is correct.

How did the crack in the furnace take

Did they do it?

I don't know that.

they discovered a crack there.
crack got there?
was there?

But then the

They said

Does anyone say how the

when the crack was there?

How did it take place?

How long it

Did the thing cool

off three days after the closing and then it pulled apart
because one part of the furnace was warm and cold?
THE COURT:
MR. BRUSSOW:

I understand.
So my issue is this, there has

got to be some credible proof about when the crack
occurred* and there is contradictions even in their own
agent, all right, who says that the furnace was not
cracked prior to the closing.

So obviously it had to

crack after that date and before the furnace person tried
to light it, but when was that?

And I think that that is

the burden of proof the plaintiffs have to satisfy rather
than coming in saying, "Five days later there was a crack
in there.

Our inspector didn't find the crack.

it crack?"

And that is a burden of proof.

When did

That is a

question of fact.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.
24

1

MR. BRUSSOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. LATULIPPE:

Anything else, Ms. Latulippe.
Just very briefly.

First of

4

all, I think the intent is apparent from the four corners

5

of the contract and we submit it is not ambiguous.

6

Secondly, we would rely again on Brooks where

7

there was an inspection prior to the closing.

8

the time when the initial contract was made and the time

9 J

it closed, and again in that inspection everything was

10

In-between

okay.

11 J

As in our case, the inspection occurred, I

12

believe, in the middle of March.

13

month later in April.

14

first attempt to turn on the furnace it would not work.

15

The gas was cut.

16

furnace.

17

condition operable before closing, plaintiffs would not

18

have possession of the property.

19

gone in to verify that fact.

20

The house closed a

As you stated, as we stated, the

The plaintiffs could not have used the

And as to proving that the furnace was in a

They could not have

Next, I would just disagree with counsel as to

21

the contract interpretation again in that approval by the

22

buyers from the inspection does not negate the express

23

warranties; and as to time and the 30 days, plaintiffs,

24

as I said before, they were young buyers.

25

see me. We got a letter off.

They came to

We did it as soon as
25

1

possible.

2

THE COURT:

3

the arguments of both counsel.

4

beginning of this hearing, I've read your memoranda and

5

the attachments to it and I looked specifically at the

6

affidavits, as well as the contract that is at issue

7

here, and I am prepared to rule at this time.

8
9

Thank you, counsel.

I appreciate

As I indicated at the

Having considered your arguments and also the
cases cited in the memoranda, it appears to me, first of

10

all, summary judgment as you both know is only

11

appropriate where there are not genuine issues as to

12

material fact that are in dispute.

13

burden is on the moving party to prove —

14

that there are no genuine issues of material facts in

15

dispute:

16

And obviously the
to demonstrate

Counsel for the defendants has claimed that

17

there are such that this matter needs to go to the jury

18

and they look at the two issues that have been focused on

19

here to resolve this Motion for Summary Judgment.

20

First of all, I don't see that —

although it

21

wasn't specifically argued by Mr. Brussow in his comments

22

to the Court, it did appear in the memorandum.

23

see that that was an adhesion contract standard format

24

and I don't see anything at all that would indicate that

25 I

it has the indicia of being an adhesion contract.

I don't

There
26

1

is a right to a jury trial only if summary judgment is

2

not appropriate, of course, and obviously the parties

3

have their day in court in the context of summary

4

judgment.

5

constitutes the parties' day in court.

6

If summary judgment is appropriate, that

I have also indicated my response to the

7

objection filed to the plaintiffs' affidavit.

There were

8

objections made in the pleadings to the defendants'

9

affidavit, but I didn't focus on those as such.

However,

10

I did look at those very carefully and was very careful

11

in reviewing the affidavit of the defendants.

12

party has to substantiate their claims with affidavits,

13

appropriate affidavits and exhibits.

14

course, defendants cannot stand or the non-moving party

15

cannot stand on the pleadings but rather must come

16

forward with evidence that would rebut the affidavits and

17 I

other evidence presented by the moving party.

18 I

also indicated the efforts regarding settlement are not

19

really relevant to this determination.

20

considered them in coming to the ruling that I have.

21

Moving

And then, of

I have

I have not

It appears to me that the parties did engage or

22

agreed that an inspection would occur of the various

23

equipment on the property, including the heating system

24

and swimming pool, and there were one or two others.

25 I

There is clearly an express warranty in the Earnest Money
27

Sales Agreement that warrants the equipment on the
property and warrants that it is in good working order.
I frankly do not see anything in this contract
that in my judgment makes it an ambiguous contract.
~* Looking at the four corners of the contract, it appears
to me that there was an express warranty and the fact
that they agreed to an inspection doesn't diminish the
warranty, as I see it, but rather it gives some practical
level of comfort to the new buyers as to the equipment
that is on the property that they wish to have inspected.
Nevertheless, I don't think that there is anything in the
contract that makes it ambiguous as to what the parties
intended.

The defendants' statement he didn't expressly

warrant that equipment, I think is parol, is not
permitted under the Parol Evidence Rule and, frankly,
because agreements of the parties emerged in the
contract.
I don't see any facts alleged by the defendant
set forth a question that would take this out of the
conclusion that the contract is not ambiguous.

Therefore

as to that issue, I find the contract is clear on its
face on the four corners.

That the defendants warranted

the use of that furnace to the plaintiffs.
Now as to Mr. Brussow's issue that there wasn't
proof as to whether that furnace was broken on the day of
28

1

the closing, it seems to me that it was clear the furnace

2

couldn't have been used by the plaintiffs until they had

3

their_, natura1 gas hook-up done byMountain Fuel and that

4

wasn't done until after they got into the property.

5

seems to me that the only evidence, the only credible

6

evidence before the Court is that the furnace was not —

7 J

when the plaintiffs first attempted to use it, was not in

8 I

good working order and could not be used.

9

that there is an issue of fact that has been presented to

It

I don't think

10

the Court in the defendant's memorandum that will

11

overcome the plaintiff's proof before the Court that the

12

furnace, when it- ™ftp* first attempted to be hooked up, was

13

not in good working order.

14 J

to have been broken on the day that the contract was

15

finally signed and the parties obtained possession.

16

Rather, I think that when they attempted to first use it

17

and it doesn't work, is a more salient date.

18

Accordingly, I am going to grant summary judgment in

19

favor of the plaintiffs for the reasons I have indicated

20

on the record.

I don' think the furnace had

21

Now the contract, and for the amount pleaded in

22

the contract, contract does indicate that attorney's fees

23

and costs may be awarded for attempts to enforce the

24

contract.

25 I

attorney's fees is the affidavit.
*v^ -———

All IJiave before me right now as to the
There is no
29

itemization, and it strikes me as high, a high amount
given the amount that is in dispute here.

So if the

plaintiffs wish to recover any attorney's fees, I will
need at least an itemization of your attorney's fees and
I want it to be reflected as to how much was devoted to
preparation of the briefs, argument, and, you know, a
complete breakdown as to how time was spent.

When that

is submitted, the defendants may, if they choose, file an
objection if there is any objection to that. A
reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded in this case and
also costs.

But I am not awarding any specific

attorney's fees until I determine that the fees that are
submitted are reasonable.
Ms. Latulippe, I want you to prepare an order
that comports with my ruling today.
MR. BRUSSOW:

Your Honor, would the Court speak

to the amount of damages that the Court found with regard
to the amount of money due for the furnace?
THE COURT: Well, the amount that was pleaded
for was $1,100 and that is the only amount before the
Court.

Now, I have actually ruled on the liability issue

and I just indicated that the amount prayed for was the
amount of the summary judgment.

You know, there is no

evidence, actually, other than the plaintiffs' affidavit
as to the amount that they expended for the replacement
30

1 I

of that furnace.

2 I

not —

3

appropriate.

4

provided to them, replaced that furnace rather than

5

repaired it and that is the only evidence before the

6

Court.

7 I

amount then is appropriate.

8
9

14

15 I

And based on the information that had been

It seems to me that summary judgment in that

Your Honor, the Court is awarding

a brand new furnace in an old house?
THE COURT:

That is the only evidence before

the Court at this time, Mr. Brussow.

12
13

that they could not repair that and repair wasn't

MR. BRUSSOW:

10
11

There is also evidence_£h£t they did

MR. BRUSSOW:

Yes, Your Honor.

Thank you, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

The Court is in recess.

*****
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9
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10

testimony and proceedings, to the best of my ability on

11

said date in the above-entitled matter, presided over

12

by the Honorable Anne M. Stirba in the Third District

13

Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; and that the

14

foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 31, inclusive,

15

contain a full, true and correct account of said

16

proceedings of Motion for Summary Judgment to the best

17
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